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C H A P T E R 1. 
INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
There has been a growing interest in recent years 
in the Value Added Tax (hereinafter referred to as 
the VAT). Interest in tax reform is perennial 
but the factor which has generated such wide interest 
in the VAT has been its adoption by the member 
countries of the European Economic Community (EEC). 
The recent entry of Britain into the EEC and her 
adoption of the VAT have increased South African 
interest 1n the system because of the strong 
trading ties between our two countries. The 
Franzsen1 commission on taxation in South Africa 
gave some attention the the VAT but in their own 
opinion not enough. 
statement: 
This is clear from their 
"The Commission is aware of the fact that a 
transition from the selective sales tax which rests 
on a commodity basis to a Value Added Tax, which 
is essentially a turnover tax, implies important 
administrative changes. It is felt, nevertheless, 
that the Value Added Tax merits further study 11 • 
I 
This thesis hopes to satisfy some of that need 
for further study. The aim of the thesis is not 
to arrive at a definite conclusion as to whether 
South Africa should or should not adopt the VAT, 
indeed, it may be impossible to answer this question 
completely objectively. Rather the thesis sets 
out to examine the implications, both theoretical 
and practical, of a VAT, and to present certain 
guide-lines as to what may constitute the best form 
of a VAT should it be decided to introduce this mode 
of taxation. There is no separate section on South 
Africa. Instead, the implications for South Africa 
have been integrated into the main body of the text. 
For this reason, the emphasis throughout has been 
on the VAT replacing the selective sales tax and, 
to a lesser extent, the profits tax. It is felt 
that the selective sales tax would be the tax most 
likely to be replaced by the VAT in South Africa, 
and that the added revenue which could be collected 
from the broader-based VAT could possibly be off-set 
against the revenue lost on a reduction in company 
profits tax. Such a measure would certainly.be 
well received among business men. 
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Chapter 2 of the thesis gives a brief history 
of the VAT. The aim is to show that the VAT 
was not simply created in its final form, but 
rather that it represents the most refined form 
of a turnover tax which has been modified through 
successive stages in response to problems which 
have occured in each of the preceding stages. In 
fact, this process of development does not seem to 
have ended and it is interesting to note that 
countries who have come on to the VAT more recently 
have not adopted every aspect of the French system. 
In particular, they have tended to simplify the 
administration by using fewer rates, a different 
credit mechanism, and a simpler system of collection 
and inspection. 
Chapter 3 discusses the various questions relating 
to the tax base. It begins with the discussion of 
the nature of the base in theoretical economic 
terms .. This is followed by an analysis of the 
effects of different modes of calculation upon the 
nature of the base. The advantages and disadvantages 
of the different methods of calculation are examined 
as are the anomalies which may occur under systems 
of multiple rates. It is argued that the method 
of calculation which gives rise to divergences 
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between nominal and effective rates is both 
unnecessary and unfair. There is also a general 
discussion on depreciation in relation to the VAT, 
exemptions and zero rating. 
The results of the preceding discussion are 
incorporated in an attempt to define a possible 
base for the VAT in South Africa. While wishing 
to maintain, as far as possible, the essential 
homogeneity of the VAT for reasons of horizontal 
equity, neutrality and administrative ease, it is 
recognised that there will be some special categories 
of taxpayers who should be excluded from the base. 
It is argued tha~ small businesses with turnovers 
of less than RlO 000 per annum, and financial 
institutions, should be excluded from the base for 
administrative reasons. It is also argued that, 
at least in the beginning, the destination prin~iple 
should be adopted for exports, which would effectively 
exclude them from the tax base. Although the need 
to give favourable treatment to the essentials of 
life, particularly food, is recognised, it is 
tentatively suggested that with regard to the particular 
structure of the agricultural industry in South Africa, 
the European system of zero rating should not be -
adopted. Instead, an alternative system is proposed 
- s ~ 
whereby the prices of the essential food.s could 
be kept down by means of subsidies to the marketing 
boards. 
Finally, there is a calculation of the potential 
revenue which could be raised from two possible 
alternative VAT bases. 
The discussion of equity and efficiency in Ch.apter 4 
sets out to question some of the assumptions which 
are usually made regarding these concepts. Although 
the general contention that the introduction of a 
VAT implies a trade-off between some loss in vertical 
equity and some gain in neutrality and horizontal 
equity is not cast aside :.· The chapter points to 
some of the deeper ·theoretical work which shows 
that the assumptions upon which these analytical 
results are based may not always hold. 
Chapter 5 on Shifting and Incidence follows upon 
the discussion of equity. It discusses the nature 
and extent of shifting and incidence in terms of 
the general theoretical framework and in the South 
African context. It also cites the results of 
certain emperical studies overseas which may be 
relevant to South Africa. 
- 6 ..,.. 
The use of the VAT as a fast-reacting instrument 
of stabilization policy has often been cited as 
one of its advantages. Chapter 6 explores this 
contention and concludes that adjustments in VAT 
rates would probably have a quick positive effect 
on consumption, but that the effect on investment 
is far less certain. The effectiveness of the 
VAT as an automatic stabilizer is again uncertain. 
There are arguments both ways, but on a priori 
reasoning it is concluded that in so far as VAT 
replaces selective sales taxes in South Africa 
it will improve automatic stability. The results 
of certain econometric models and the European 
experience of the VAT as a stabilizer are examined 
and they tend to confirm that the VAT has some 
potential as an automatic stabilizer. However, 
attention is drawn to the fact that these results 
may not be applicable in South Africa. 
Finally, Chapter 7 explores the administrative 
complexities of the VAT. It als.o examines some of 
the statistical possibilities of the system. As in 
the case of the Chapter of the VAT base, there is 
an attempt to define a system which would be 
appropriate to South Africa. 
- 7 -
Basically) the aim is to simplify administration 
as much as possible by avoiding the pitfalls of 
the early French system and by taking advantage 
of the improved procedures which have been· adopted 
by later converts to the VAT. 
~ 8 ~ .· 
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CH APTER 2. 
HISTORY: 
The indirect tax systems in Europe seem to have 
followed an evolutionary process of development, 
with the VAT as the latest, most sophisticated of 
the turnover taxes. 
The French system developed through five clearly 
discernable phases, whereas most other countries, 
who adopted the VAT later and were thus able to 
benefit from the French ~xperience, went straight 
from the more primitive forms of the turnover tax 
to the VAT. The need for tax harmonization within 
the European Economic Community has also provided a 
stimulus to the adoption of the VAT. 
The phases of this development in the cases of 
. Prance and Germany are presented in the historical 
summary below. 
1. Cascade Tax: 
A general tax on turnover without any allowable 
deduction for previous taxes on the inputs. 
- 10 ..,.. 
It was introduced in Germany (1918) at a rate 
of 0, 5 percent and France (19 20) at a rate of 
2,0 percent~ It led to cascading because tax 
was being paid on prices which already included 
an element of tax. 
2. Single Stage $elective Taxes (Taxes Unique): 
The disadvantages of the cascade taxes, such as 
the incentive towards vertical integration, caused 
considerable criticism. Thus taxes were introduced, 
for certain categories of goods, which were levied 
at a single stage in the production process. These 
"taxes unique" relieved the product of liability to 
the turnover tax (France 1926). 
3. Single Stage General Tax (Regime Suspensif): 
U.nder this system all products were subjected to 
tax but actual payment was suspended until the 
last stage in the production chain. This eased 
the administration burden of categorizing taxpayers, 
particularly those with mixed product lines. The 
"regime suspensif" also allowed for a deduction of 
taxes paid on goods which were physically consumed 
in the production process, but not for fixed capital 
inputs (France 1936). 
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4. Fractional Payments (VAT): 
Whereas previously goods were transferred between 
producers free of tax with the burden falling on 
the last in the chain, each producer now paid his 
share, but was allowed to deduct the tax included 
in the purchase cost of his input. By this method 
each taxpayer only paid tax on the value which he 
added to the product, hence the name (France 1948). 
5. Financial Deduction (VAT}: 
The financial deduction referred to capital goods 
which were now included as allowable deductions. 
The West Germans were so dissatisfied with the 
cascade tax that they adopted the VAT in January 1968 
although the EEC directive required them to adopt 
it only in January 1970. 
From the pattern of these developments, it is clear 
that as changes were introduced to overcome weaknesses 
in the system, so new problems appeared. The system 
was then further refined at each stage to eliminate the 
new problems. 
Por example, the 'Taxes Uniques' in step 2 were 
intended as a measure to overcome the~uble taxation 
of the cascade taxes. However, the 'Taxes Uniques' 
proved difficult to administer. There were different 
rates for different products which gave rise to 
confusion and provided scope for evasion. The 
problems of admin1stration were compounded by the 
rapid growth in the number of products subjected to 
tax. These 'Taxes Uniques' which were similar to the 
selective sales taxes, in South Africa, were ~ucceeded 
in France by the 'regime suspensif' which was a single 
stage general sales tax. This definitely improved 
the system, but the French found that the single 
stage provided an incentive to evasion1 . Thus they 
introduced the VAT with its unique feature of 
fractional payments. This fractional payments system 
has certain other advantages besid~ the con.trol of 
evasion. For example, it places a smaller burden on 
the retailer than the single stage retail sales tax. 
This is particularly important. in the case of 
competitive markets, and for the small retailer. 
In such cases the retailer may be forced to extend 
credit to his customers, yet he has to pay his tax 
in cash. The single stage system implies that one 
member of the production chain has to provide cash 
to cover the tax liability of other members of the 
chain. However, in the fractional payments system 
the actual payment is spread among the members of the 
chain. 
Another advantage of fractional payments is the 
complete~limination of the cascade. The cascade 
which occurs under the selective sales taxes is not 
completely eliminated by~the single stage retail tax 
because products which are sold as 'final goods' 
may be used as inputs in a later process without 
the possibility of deduction. An example would be 
the motor car battery which may be sold as a retail 
good or as a motor car component. 
The Financial Deduction of stage 5 was introduced 
in order to prevent the double taxation of capital 
goods. The nub of the argument was. that by restricting 
the deduction to raw materials, capital goods whic~ 
were used up in the process of manufacture, thus 
contributing to the final value, were being taxed 
as part of value added whereas they had already borne 
tax at the time they were acquired. 
Future Development: 
This process of development is continuing and it 
is possible to predict further probable modifications. 
- 14 ~ 
The group 'Piscalite' reporting to the Finance.committee 
for the Sixth Plan in France has recommended that the 
administration be simplif{ed by reducing the number 
of different rates and by adjustments to the credit 
h 
. 2 mec an1sm . These adjustments, which are discussed 
in the section on administration, are likely to be 
introduced. 
Indeed the most likely trend in the future development 
of the VAT will be towards greater administrative 
simplicity. 
-. 15 ~ 
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C H A P T E R 3. 
THE VAT BASE, ITS MODE OF CALCULATION AND POTENTIAL 
REVENUE YIELD:: 
3.1. THE DEFINITION OF THE BASE: 
Historically the concept of a tax based on value 
added goes back long before the introduction of 
>JF 
the VAT in France in 1954-. As early as 19 32 a 
Brookings Institute report on the Alabama system 
observed that a tax on the social dividend would 
1 
be distributed according to a firm's share of the 
total income earned within the State. The report 
recommended a base which was described as 
approximating value added by manufacture as 
estimated by the United States Bureau of the Census. 
This early conceptual use of value added as a 
measure of a firm's contribution to the social 
product was criticised because on the one hand it 
excluded products which the firm manufactured for 
itself, and on the other hand it included deprecia-
tion and certain indirect taxes which should have 
been deducted in computing a proper national 
income. National income accounting has been greatly 
developed since the early '30s and national income 
- 17 -
or national product type bases can now be fairly 
accurately measured by a number of techniques. 
Our question is no longer "how good a measure of 
the base is given by value added in manufacture?" 
but rather "how appropriate is the national 
income~ or national product concept of value added 
as the base for the value added tax?". 
There are three ways in which the VAT base, as 
customarily defined, differs from the national 
income idea of value added. Firstly, there is the 
question of replacement expenditure on capital 
equipment. The VAT does not distinguish between 
replacement investment and new investment. Under 
the VAT system all investment is deducted from 
·the base. Whereas in national income accounting 
a distinction is usually made between the two. 
Secondly, there is the question of services by 
professional men. Often these are excluded from 
the VAT base, but they are certainly included as 
value added in the national income system. The 
same applies to salaries of Government servants. 
These salaries add to national product but again 
they are excluded from the VAT base. Thirdly, 
the two systems are the reverse of each.other, 
in their handling of international trade. The 
~ 18 -
national income definition includes exports in 
value added, since the work done in producing the 
exports was done in the home country. Conversely 
exports are usually excluded from the VAT base. 
Imports are also handled in contrary fashion by 
the two systems. Whereas the national income base 
excludes imports on the ground that the work was 
not done in the home country, they are subjected 
to tax under the VAT. 
Now if the VAT base is indeed so different from 
the normal economic definition of value added, one 
wonders why it is called a value added tax at all. 
Indeed, it would probably be more correct to call 
it a fractionated consumption tax. However, it 
is probably a little late to change the name now. 
Rather let us turn our attention to those factors 
which distinguish the base of this tax from r.he 
bases of the other consumption taxes. The 
essential distinguishing features of the VAT are: 
(a) that it is fractionated which means that 
payment is made at many stages, rather than at a 
single stage; (bl that the base is very wide; partly 
as a consequence of the fractionation; Cc) that it 
is probably the most general of the sales taxes. 
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3.2. INCOME VERSUS CONSUMPTION: 
Essentially two types of tax base have been 
distinguished for VAT. The Income type base and 
the Consumption type base. The so called additive 
procedure is used to derive the Income type base and 
the subtractive procedure is used to derive the 
Consumption type base. The subtractive procedure 
for the consumptive type base was selected for the 
E.E.C. countries but Japanese accountants preferred 
the additive procedure or an income type base, 
Japanese tax officials, however, wanted the 
subtractive procedure to facilitate cross checking 
to detect evasion2 . The differences, and at the 
same time the similarities of the two procedures 
become evident once we consider the modes of 
calculation. The subtractive method is simply to 
subtract total input from total output, thus value 
added is defined as being ~qual to output minus input 
The difference between the total physical output 
and input leaves us with a residual of wages plus 
profits. The additive procedure utilises this 
result by going directly to wages plus profits for 
its base~ 
3.3. DIRECT AND INDIRECT METHODS: 
Now the additive and sub·tractive procedures can 
again be broken down into two alternative modes 
of calculation. These are the direct and indirect 
methods. Consider first the subtractive procedure. 
The direct method would be to begin by getting 
the difference between total output and total 
input and then applying the tax rate to the 
difference. The indirect method would be to apply 
the tax rate to the output and the input separately 
and then to deduct the tax on input from the tax 
on output. Although algebracally the results are 
identical, the practical effects are different. 
Under the indirect system the taxpayer first has 
to determine that VAT was paid on his inputs before 
he is able to claim a reduction in determining 
his own liability. Whereas, under the direct 
procedure he merely calculates the difference 
between his own sales and his purchases. It is 
this necessity for proving by way of invoice that 
members of the chain at early stages have paid their 
VAT which led to this indirect subtractive method 
being referred to as the invoicing system. The 
invoicing feature of this system is regarded as a 
great advantage by many tax officials because they 
claim that the necessity of each member in checking 
the VAT liability of previous members in tl"!.e chain 
of production provides a built-in policing mechanism. 
.,.. 21 ..,., 
The E.E.C. reason for adopting the subtractive 
method was that it enabled the tax content of any 
sale to be established immediately. This facili-
tated the working of their customs union which 
employed the destination principle, whereby goods 
are exempted from taxation by the exporting country 
and taxed in the importing country. Clearly, 
therefore, the tax content has to be known in order 
to effect the necessary rebates. It had the further 
advantage for the E.E.C. countries of being 
acceptable within the bounds of the G.A.T.T. rulings 
on fair trade. The fact of rebates being allowed 
to exporters implies a hidden subsidy to exporters 
in those countries which are on the VAT. 
The major disadvantages of this method appear when 
there are more than one rate. Firstly, the 
administration becomes more complex as goods have 
to be ~lassified ihto one or another category. 
Often the distinctions are subtle and taxpayers 
will try to find arguments for qualifying under the 
lower rates. Furthermore, there is a problem known 
as the "catching up" effect. This problem is 
most clearly explained by way of an example. 
- 22 """ 
Assume that there are two VAT rates operating, 
5% and 10%. Assume further that the inputs of our 
company were subjected to tax at the lower rate of 
5% but that the outputs are subject to a normal 
rate at 10%. Now if inputs are valued at RlOO 
and outputs at Rl50 then the value added is R50. 
Under the direct method the 10% tax rate would be 
applied to this R50 and the VAT liability would be 
R5. However, under the indirect method the 10% 
tax is applied to the Rl50 output yielding Rl5, 
but a deduction of only RS is allowable because the 
VAT on the input was only RS. This leaves a 
liability of RlO, which is greater than the liability 
under the direct method. Thus the brunt of the tax 
is borne by those on a higher rate. Conversely 
if the inputs were subject to the 10% rate and the 
outputs were subject to the lower 5% rate, the 
lower rated taxpayer would get all the benefit of 
the tax relief, part of which should have gcT1e to 
his predecessors in the chain. Clearly, this 
catching up effect would not apply in the case of 
only one rate for the subtractive procedure. We 
shall return to a fuller discussion of this catching 
up effect in the section on administration. 
The direct additive method has the major advantage 
of simplicity. The concepts of wages and profits 
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are both familiar to the revenue department and 
to the accounting profession. Wages are already 
determined regularly under the P.A.Y.E. system and 
present n6 problem. Profits too are easy to 
account for as they are audited annually for income 
tax purposes and it would be little extra burden 
to audit the same profit for the VAT. However, 
this is where the simplicity ends. Profits are 
only audited annually and in order for this system 
to work correctly, the VAT would also need to be 
collected annually. It is not reasonable to 
expect firms to carry the extra dministrative burden 
of drawing up their income statements for tax purposes 
more than once a year. If the VAT were only 
collected annually, this would reduce the revenue 
flow, decreas~ its value as a stati~tical source 
and reduce its potential as a fiscal weapon. 
The final divergence in modes of calculatio~ which 
we shall consider is the decision between tax 
inclusive and tax exclusive prices for the base. 
3.4. NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE RATES: 
If the price upon which the tax is calculated is 
taken exclusive of the tax then there is no difference 
between the stated rate of taxation and the actual 
effective rate. This is the mode of application in 
most of the E.E.C. countries and it is in accordance 
with the Second Directive of the Council for the 
3 E.E.C •. 
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Presumably the French will eventually 
be forced to comply with this directive but at the 
moment they operate an alternative system. In 
France the tax is levied upon the price inclusive 
of tax. The effect of this application is to raise 
the real rate of tax above the nominally stated 
rate. Consider for example the case of a seller 
who wishes to maintain a net turnover of RlOO 
in the face of a VAT rate of 10%. Under the price 
exclusive-of-tax mechanism, his tax will be RlO. 
This RlO would be added to the RlOO making a final 
price of R·llO. However, under the tax-inclusive 
mechanism he would be required to pay a tax of 10% 
on the RilO. Already this raises his basic rate 
from 10% to 11% on the original RlOO. Now if he 
pays the Rll he will only be left with a net 
turnover of R99. Should he wish to maintain this 
turnover at RlOO he would be required to raise his 
final selling price to Rll,11 so that when ti.1e 10% 
rate is applied to this price he is left with the 
desired residue. The final effective rate would 
then be 11,1%. 
The author is opposed to this aspect of the French 
system and does not recommend a system which allows 
a divergence between the real and the effective rate 
in South Africa. This mechanism has the 
overtones of a subterfuge by the Government to 
disguise the real rate of the tax from the taxpayer. 
It conflicts with the well known principle of 
taxation that the taxpayer should consider that he 
is being fairly treated if he is to be expected to 
•th h h .. 4 co-operate wi t e aut or1t1es . Particularly 
in South Africa with its complex social structure 
where Government is vested largely in the hands of 
one ethnic or racial group among many, there is a 
great need not to create mistruct between taxpayer 
and tax collector. Further, this seems to 
introduce an unnecessary complication into the 
pricing. 
3.5. TREATMENT OF DEPRECIATION: 
The question of depreciation is still one of the 
most controversial in the field of Public Finance. 
The fundamental principle is simple. Given that 
there are inputs which, though not completely used 
up, will be partly worn out in the process of 
production, the portion of these inputs which is 
consumed in production should be allowed as a 
deduction from output in determining value added. 
In practice, this principle turns out to be very 
difficult to apply and even in the area of national 
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income accounting, where depreciation is calculated, 
the measurement is in the nature of a rough 
approximation to the principle. Firstly, there is 
the problem of human as well as physical capital. 
Clearly, humans wear away with time. Marshall 
for one, recognized this when he referred to "the 
investment of capital in the rearing and early 
5 training of the workers of England 11 • More 
recently a number of economists have come out in 
favour of depreciating human capital. In practice, 
however, depreciation has been restricted to 
physical capital. 
Assuming we follow the usual procedure and allow. 
depreciation only on physical capital, which method 
would be the most appropriate? Consider the 
question of the rate of decay of the assets. Some 
techniques assign a fixed life period to each asset 
and depreciate it in equal instalments until the end 
of its "life". Others are based upon constant 
or varying percentages of a reducing value for the 
assets. bbviously, these techniques are just 
approximations because we cannot know for sure how 
much of the asset has been used up in a particular 
period. Furthermore, there is the problem of 
whether to use current or historical prices·, 
particularly in times of inflation. Now the 
varying of the depreciation period has an important 
distorting effect upon the value of different kinds 
of investment. The shorter the time period of the 
depreciation the smaller is the burden of the tax., 
because the tax deduction accrues in an earlier 
period and therefore its discounted net present 
value is higher. Now if we have two investments 
with different life periods the one yielding a return 
over ten years and the other over five years, but 
these investments have the same internal rate of 
return, then they are by definition equally 
profitable. If the tax were to change the internal 
rate of return of the one vis a vis the other, then 
the tax would be distorting investment choice and 
would not be neutral. This has been shown to be 
the case where depreciation deductions are allowed 
·. 6 
over various time periods . Neutrality is 
achieved only in the case of instantaneous CE-~pre-
ciation. 
This ins-tcmtaneous depreciation is a. feature of 
the VAT which is consistent with the goal of a 
neutral tax. Another reason why instantaneous 
depreciation is preferred for the VAT is that it 
should be a long term stimulus to investmertt because 
the immediate deduction reduces the net present 
-. 28 ~ 
value of the burden of the tax, assuming that a 
policy of promoting investment is socially desirable. 
Finally, it is far easier to administer than a 
system which distinguishes capital and non capital 
purchases and varies the deduction for capital 
purchases. 
3.6. EXCLUSIONS FROM THE VAT: 
In spite of the desire to make the VAT as general 
as possible, it has been found necessary in all the 
countries which have adopted it, to exclude certain 
special categories from the tax base either for 
social or for administrative reasons. The most 
obvious way to do this is simply to exempt those 
categories of taxpayer from coming into the VAT 
system. This has the administrative advantage 
of reducing the number of tax payers. However, 
exemption is not quite as equitable as it would 
seem superficially. The exempt enterprise has to 
pay for the advantage of not paying tax by carrying 
the burden of not being able to deduct the VAT 
paid on its inputs. Where the enterprise has 
large investments in capital stock this can amount 
--
to a substantial disadvantage. Furthermore, double 
taxation can occur where the enterprise is 
intermediate between two enterprises which are both 
subject to the VAT. In this case it is unable to 
pass on the tax credit in its purchases and so the 
purchase ~lement in its sales will be taxed again 
in the hands of the recipient7 
To overcome this problem a system of zero rating 
has been introduced in a number of countries. 
Originally, this measure was adopted in the second 
directive of the E.E.C. to comply with the wishes 
of the Dutch Government
8 
who wished to retain their 
freedom to make decisions regarding the total tax 
burden and its distribution among the various 
sectors of the population in their country. 
According to this system, enterprises which are 
favoured for one reason or another, still come 
into this system which means that they can deduct 
the VAT content in their inputs and also pass it 
forward as a credit if they are at an interm~diate 
stage, but they themselves are not subjected to tax 
because a zero rate is applied to their sales. 
Al though zero rating is thus more equitable than 
exemption, it suffers from the general administrative 
disadvantages which apply to multiple rates. 
3. 7. A POSSIBLE BASE FOR THE .. VAT IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
When considering a possible value added tax base 
for· South Africa, the problem of the very skewed 
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distribution of income immediately springs to mind. 
Clearly, a case can be made for keeping down the 
prices of essentials in South Africa with its 
particular distribution of income. This is one 
of the reasons why food has been given special 
treatment in all of the European systems. Another 
reason, of course, may be the political pressure 
of farmers. However, this has to be balanced 
against the administrative complexity which is 
introduced with each special case, and also the need 
to maintain the generality of the base in the 
interests of horizontal equity and neutrality. 
Having regard to these opposing goals, a tentative 
system might take the following form. 
The VAT base would be as wide as is practical or 
feasible allowing the minimum exclusions. 
Administratively, it would probably be necessary 
to exempt services in the early stages, but as 
experience is gained in running the system, they 
could be included. Existing excise taxes will 
be maintained, but adjusted to take account of the 
VAT so as to leave the final price of the good 
unchanged. Services are exempted, rather than 
zero rated, because zero rating would negate the 
administrative advantages to be gained from 
exemption. The base would be of the consumption 
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type using the subtractive procedure which is 
used in the E.E.C. This decision is discussed 
under the section on administration. 
Let us now consider the case for inclusion or 
exclusion of certain special categories from the 
South African VAT base. 
3.8. GOVERNMENT:-
At first sight it would appear illogical for 
Government agencies to b.e required to pay the tax 
because this would merely involve the transfer of 
funds from one brand of Government to another. 
However, there are both theoretical and practical 
objections to such a policy. Numerous debates 
on the subject have taken place in both the 
Nai;:ional Assembly and the Senate in France. The 
principle was most succinctly stated by Monsieur 
Wedert
9
• If, he said, private consumption was 
alone in supporting the VAT the tax would not be 
neutral because the price comparisons between the 
two types of consumption goods would be falsified. 
What he was assuming of course was that there was 
competition between Government run industries and 
others. This was a perfectly reasonable assumption 
since the provision of a good by the State does not 
necessarily imply that the private sector should be 
prevented from providing that good as well. 
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However, there are some industries in South Africa 
where competition with the State is not only non-
existent but is prohibited by law. In such cases 
there would be no conflict in principle to their 
exclusion from the VAT base. Nevertheless, there 
are strong practical ~easons for not excluding 
state enterprises. Consider for instance the case 
of the South African Railways. Railag~ co~ts or 
even ordinary train tickets for travelling 
businessmen are inputs to businesses. Thus these 
businessmen would want to be able to deduct the VAT 
from their outputs. Furthermore, the Railways 
will have included the cost of its inputs in its 
price and there will be an accumulation of previous 
VAT paid on inputs by the Railways unless this 
credit can be passed on. Obviously, similar 
situations are likely to occur in the Airways, 
Post Office and many other State run enterprises. 
At one stage local authorities in France wanted to 
be excluded from paying VAT on their purchases as 
well as their sales10 . Clearly this is not 
feasible administratively because it would imply 
that each seller would have to identify the 
purchaser before determining the price and it would 
lead to complications far greater even than multiple 
rating. The balance of the argument, therefore, 
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would seem to be in favour of including Government 
enterprises in the VAT base. Clearly, Government 
agencies would not actually be expected to render 
a cash return, but would merely be expected to make 
the requisite book entries from time to time • 
.. 
3.9. SMALL BUSINESS~ 
The argument for exempting small business 
establishments is an administrative one. It is 
generally felt that the inclusion of small business 
will increase the number of taxpayers greatly. 
Since their turnover is small the revenue yield 
would not be very great, thus the cost of 
collecting and inspecting their taxes would probably 
outweigh the return. Furthermore, many small 
businesses keep very primitive forms of accounts, if 
they keep accounts at all. If they are forced to 
keep the accounts necessary for the correct and 
smooth operation of the VAT, they are likely to 
become uncooperative. 
On the other hand, there are two principle 
arguments against exemption. Firstly, there. is 
·the argument that in order to retain the essential 
homogeneity of the VAT, the number of exceptions 
to the general rule should be kept to an absolute 
minimum. The second argument is based upon the 
fear that if the small businesses are removed from 
the tax base, it will become too narrow to provide 
~~~~~.;,.....~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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the required yield. 
In assessing the opposing arguments our choice 
is complicated by the fact that there has been a 
tremendous diversity in the choices made by the 
European countries. In the Netherlands and in 
Prance for instance, businesses with a tax liability 
below a specified limit are exempted from the tax. 
Denmark, Germany and Britain, however, have chosen 
to base th~ exemption upon the turnover. 
According to the Nedo Report11 ,.exemption of small 
businesses in Germany with turnovers of less than 
£1200 per annum had the effect of reducing the 
number of taxpayers by l/3rd. While this measure 
greatly eased the administrative problems it does 
not seem to have narrowed the base unduly. The 
exemption limit adopted by the British when they 
adopted the VAT in April 1973 was £5000. 
4 In order to establish a policy for South Africa 
we shall assume an exemption for small businesses 
whose turnovers do not exceed RlO 000 p.a. The 
choice between the turnover and the liability type 
bases seems to be fairly clear cut. There is no 
reason to complicate the issue by working out a 
tax liability when the company is going to. be 
exempt"ed afterwards. Therefore, a turnover base 
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is preferred. Referring to Table 1 below, we note 
that an exemption limit at a turnover of RlO 000 per 
annum would involve '2.177 out of a total 19142 
establishments, or 16.6%. Taking the mid point to 
be the average value for the three size groups we 
compute an overall average value of gross output for 
these groups of RlO 637 000. Now on a total output 
for manufacturing of RS 983 163 000, this works out 
roughly to a narrowing of the base by one part in GOO, 
for a reduction of 1/6 in the number of taxpayers. 
Unfortunately, the available statistics for other 
industries are not broken down into size groups with 
the result that similar calculations could not be 
performed for them. However, the manufacturing 
industries currently contribute 23% of G.N.P. and their ' 
share of the total is growing, thus we may consider 
it to be an important indicator. 
TABLE .1: 12 

























Total gross manufacturing output (R'OOOs) 5 983 163 
Total number of establishments 13 142 000 1 
Source: Adapted from 'South African Statistics' 
Table L 26 Department of Statistics, Pretoria 1972. 
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The fear of a substantial diminution of the tax 
base does not seem to be very real at an exemption 
limit of RlO 000. However, the administrative 
arguments in favour of exemption appear to be 
very forceful. Zero rating is not a feasible 
alternative since this would negate the administra-
tive advantage of reducing the number of taxpayers 
through exemption, yet the State would receive no 
benefit. If a small business considered its~lf 
to be at a disadvantage through not being able 
to deduct VAT on its inputs or because of its 
inability to pass on VAT credits, then it should 
be allowed the option of coming onto the VAT as 
a normal taxpayer rather than at a zero rate. 
3.10. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: 
Wherever the VAT has .been instituted, financial 
institutions have been exempted from the base. 
In some European countries a separate tax independen-
of the VAT has been imposed instead. The reasons 
for acc6rding special treatment to financial 
institutions, are sufficiently persuasive in the 
view of the author for us to follow this practice 
in our suggested base for South Africa. 
Firstly, there would be an element of double 
taxation under the indirect subtractive method. 
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This is because interest and dividend receipts 
which are taxed in the hands of financial 
institutions, would not have been allowed as 
deductions from the VAT base of the non-financial 
company. Their inclusion in the base of both 
the financial and the non-financial company gives 
rise to a double taxation. 
This problem of double taxation would similarly 
apply to rental receipts in the hands of financial 
institutions. Special modes of calculation of 
the VAT have been devised notably by ITo13 in 
Japan to overcome this problem. However, they 
have not been entirely satisfactory because the 
effect would be to give rise to administrative 
problems in the simultaneous operation of two 
different systems of calculation for the VAT. 
A second problem arises in the actual calculation 
of the VAT for deposit receiving institutions. 
The deposit received by a bank for instance, would 
have no VAT content. Therefore, there would be 
no credit offset against the VAT liability on the 
interest received by the bank. Clearly, this 
could give rise to ludicrous situations in which 
the bank was faced with a VAT liability in excess 
of the Value Added. Consider the example of a 
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bank which received a deposit of RlOO upon which 
it paid an interest rate of 10%. If the VAT 
rate operating was 10% and the bank lent the 
money at 11%, then it would be faced with a VAT 
liability of Rl-10 whereas its own margin would 
only be Rl. Although this may be an unusual 
example, it serves to dramatise the potential 
inequity of the system• 
Life assurance companies are another very difficult 
type of financial institution to handle under the 
VAT. The crux of the problem is the long time 
period which elapses between the receipt of 
premiums and the payment of claims. The 
determination of expected present value for the 
claims to be offset against the premiums is 
further complicated by inflation~ The issue of 
life assurance has not been settled in principle 
or ih practice, and possibly the wisest decision 
is the usual one, which is simply to leave it well 
alone. 
Finally, the administrative advantage of exempting 
·-
finili1cial institutions, is clear when one considers 
the vast number of transactions which would need to 
be checked. Of course the process could be 
simplified by adopting the additive method of 
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calculation, but the simplest procedure is 
exemption. 
3 .11. THE AGRI'CULTURAL INDUSTRY:· 
There is without doubt a strong case in terms of 
the ability to pay criteria for keeping down the 
prices of the essentials of life. Partly for 
considerations of equity and partly because of 
the political power of farmers, agricultural 
products have been subjected to lower rates or 
even zero rates in the European countries under 
the VAT. Although farmers may be exempted they 
usually opt to come onto the VAT in order to 
derive the benefit of the VAT content credit of 
their inputs. The zero rate is particularly 
agreeable to farmers where they are able to obtain 
cash refunds-on their VAT inputs without paying 
any tax on their outputs. The European solution 
of low rates or zero rates for farmers may be 
popular among farmers, but it is not necessarily 
the best overall solution for the country. There 
are the usual administrative drawbacks associated 
with more than one rate, and if the farmer is not 
at the final stage in the process there is the 
added inequity of the catching up process (see 
section on administration). 
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Having consi.dered these diff:i:cul ties in the light 
of the particular marketing structure which applies 
to agriculture in South Africa, the author would 
like to suggest an alternative system which could 
be as equitable as zero rating and is free of the 
multiple rate problems. Essentially~ the idea. 
would simply be to tax agriculture at the normal 
·vAT rate. However; the prices of important 
foods would be stabilised by means of Government 
subsidies to farmers. The existence of the 
Marketing Boards and the extent of their control in 
South African agriculture, would make this a highly 
feasible possibility in. South Africa. The du 
Plessis Comrnission
14 
on agriculture reported that 
products -representing· approximately 8 7 % of the to"tal 
average value of agricultural output were subject 
to price control to a greater or lesser extent 
in the ye~rs 67/68 to 69/70. Thus we see tha.t 
there is wide central control of agricultural 
prices in the country. Furthermore, it is already 
the practice to subsidize certain staple food 
15 
stuffs , namely butter, bread, maize and, to a 
lesser exten) grain sorghum. All that would be 
required would be an increase in the value and 
perhaps the breadth of the subsidy. 
The following are some of the advantages associated 
with such a system. 
Firstly, it would not be difficult to administer 
and it would tie in well with the existing arrange-
ment of control through the Marketing Boards. 
Secondly, farmers would not suffer the loss of 
tax credits on their inputs which would arise if 
they were exempted from the base. At the same 
time, the avoidance of multiple rates would ensure 
that no other producers were prejudiced. 
Finally, the inclusion of farmers in the VAT could 
help to achieve another recommendation of the du 
Plessis Commission. The Commission pointed out 
that poor management was one of the biggest 
problems in South African agriculture. It noted 
further that the keeping of the proper system 
of farming records played an important part in 
improving the managerial ability of farmers. For 
this reason the Commission was not in favour of 
outside organisations keeping the records. It 
recormnended that the. farmer himself should be 
responsible for the basi6 bookkeeping, so that he 
could keep himself informed of conditions in his 
farming operations and thereby increase his 
productivity
16
. There can be few better stimuli 
to record keeping than a tax system which .allows 
the deduction of invoiced inputs! 
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3.12. EXPORTS AND IMPORTS: 
The two principles involved in the decision to 
include or exclude imports and exports from the VAT 
base, are the Origin principle and the Destination 
principle. 
The Origin principle states: the tax revenue should 
accrue to the home country and thus production 
should be taxed in the country of origin. This 
concept is consistent~with the national income 
definition of Value Added, whereby exports are 
included in the base and imports are excluded. 
The Destination principle is the reverse - Taxing 
imports and excluding exports. Now it has been 
argued that taxation according to the Destination 
principle conflicts with the laws of comparative 
d d .. l' . 17 a var~tage an specia isation Why then should 
it have been adopted by the E.E.C.? It appears 
that the major motivation was the possibility 
afforded by this system of providing support to 
exporters without contravening the G.A.T.T. rules 
on fair trade. This has, of course, been 
criticised by G.A.T.T. members who are not on the 
VAT, but the Destination principle is likely 
to be retained for countries outside the E.E.C., 
although it is intended that the Origin principle 
will be adopted for intra E.E.C. trading. 
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In South Africa there would presumably be strong 
political pressure from exporters to adopt the 
destination principle, indeed it would be very 
difficult not to follow this principle while it is 
being operated by a major trading partner such as 
the E.E.C. However, the prospect of independent 
homelands within South Africa raises some 
interesting questions. If each of these Bantustans 
operates its own fiscal system, then it may be 
better to adopt the Origin principle, at least 
within Southern Africa. These regions will be in 
great need of development funds and it would be as 
well for the tax revenue from the homeland 
industries to accrue to their Governments. 
3.13. POTENTIAL YIELD OF THE VAT: 
Assuming a flat rate at 10%, we shall calculate 
the yield on two possible tax bases. Tax Base A 
is exclusive of services and Tax Base B includes 
services. The alternative bases are contemplated 
because the authorities may decide to initiate 
the system exclusive of services for administrative 
simplicity and later extend the base when 
experience has been gained in administering the tax. 
.,.. 44 -
It is assumed that the excise taxes will be adjusted 
to account for the VAT and that foods will be treated 
favourably, either by means of subsidies to the 
agricultural boards or by zero rating. 
TABLE 2. 
COMPOSITION OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE18 






























Source: Adapted from~ The Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics, 
S.A. Reserve Bank, March 1973,. Table S.73. 
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The bases are derived from Table 1. Food is excluded 
on the assumption of favourable treatment and the balance 
of the deductions are to avoid double counting with the 
excise tax yield. 
































TABLE 2 , YIELD OF· VAT AT 10 PERCENT {R MILLIONS): 
CONSUMPTION SALES DIPFE- VAT 10 
TAX RENCE PERCENT 
TAX BASE .. A 3260 176 3084 308,4 
TAX BASE B 6176 176 6000 600,0 
...,.. 4 6 "'"' 
The VAT yield on Base A would,. at a rate of 10%. 
represent a 75% increase over the sales tax collection 
In the case of Base B there would be a 241% increase 
in revenue. 
Clearly the yield is very much greater when services 
are included in the base. Furthermore, services 
tend to form a greater proportion of the expenditure 
of the upper income groups and their inclusion would 
tend to counteract regression in the base. However, 
they are difficult to administer, and it may be wise 
to phase them into the system only once experience 
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C HAP T E R 4. 
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY 
EFFICIENCY~ 
4.1. PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM: 
If the VAT were introduced into South Africa, it would 
mainly take the place of the selective sales taxes. 
Let us compare the economic effiency of the VAT with 
that of the selective sales taxes. 
We shall use the Hicks (1939) 1 analysis. Assuming 
other choices to be fixed, let us consider the choice 
between two goods X and Y. The consumer has enough 
income to purchase oa of good X or ob of good Y, or 
some combination of the two, as shown in the diagram 
below. Assume an excise is imposed on good X, raising 
its price such that the new income line is b e. This 
leads to the familiar result that the highest attainable 
indifference curve IC 2 is lower than IC 3 
which could 
have been attained had there been a general tax. The 
general tax would give rise to a parallel shift from ab 




4.2. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM~ 
It would be heroic to assume that the conclusions of 
such a partial model would apply to the real world. 
The assumption of perfect competition to begin with is 
hardly realistic. Furthermore, besides the assumption 
2 that the goods are substitutes, Morag has shown that 
the results of the partial model depend upon the 
assumption of required yield which is not entirely true 
in the modern world where taxation may be employed for 
stabilisation reasons. Friedmann's general equilibrium 
model (1952) 3 extends the analysis to include the case 
where goods are produced under conditions of increasing 
cost, and also removes the necessity of assuming a 
required yield. Again the model is well known, and will 
only be discussed briefly. 
Consider the diagram below: 
OT\-\~~ 
<:;.ooDs 
R i---- \ 
The transformation curves AB and CD are concave down 
reflecting the increasing cost of transformation from 
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other goods into X. The difference between these 
two transformation curves reflects the amount of 
resources which have to be surrendered to the Government 
on the imposition of the tax. Now it is immediately 
apparent that our earlier conclusion regarding the 
superiority of the general sales tax (VAT) over the 
selective sales taxes wili be retained, this is because 
the general tax is assumed not to change the relative 
prices of X and other goods. This means that there 
is again a parallel shift of the price line in the case 
of the general tax, whereas in the case of the 
selective tax on X the slope of the price line is 
changed in favour of other goods. This means that 
after the VAT the consumer is able to find an 
equilibrium at a point further to the right along CD, 
thereby achieving a higher indifference curve, than 
he would under the selective sales tax. 
Notice also that this general equilibrium model makes 
the Morag objection redundant. As long as private 
consumption is reduced to a point on CD the amount 
of revenue raised is irrelevant and so we may drop 
the assumption of required yield. 
4.3~ ADDED DIMENSIONS OF CHOICE: 
Thus far we have restricted the choice to two 
alternatives. Once this restriction is lifted it 
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is possible theoretically to conceive of situations 
in which the superiority of general taxes over 
selective taxes is reversed. Consider the diagram 
below which is based on Little's three dimensional 









~"/ -- / ,,.· 
,./"' 
// 
The MRT's are the curves YX, YL and XL. From the 
2 dimensional analysis we know that there would be an 
optimal point on each MRT where MRT = Price Ratios. 
When raised to 3 dimensions the point becomes a line. 
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Thus we may draw lines representing the optimum field 
in 3 dimensions for each of the two dimensional planes. 
L'L, X'X and Y1 Y. 
The point of overall intersection O, is the overall 
optimum. 
Clearly, the tax would be non optimal unless it affected 
all three planes equally since a general tax in only 
two planes would operate as a specific tax in the third 
plane. Thus a general tax on X and Y would not 
discriminate between these two but would be discrimina-
tory in any comparison between Y and L and between 
X and L. 
In the case of a selective tax on X there would be 
discrimination between X and Y and between X and L 
but there would be no distortion in the Y - L 
relationship. 
The only truly general tax now would be one which 
included leisure. Since this is not a practical 
proposition the usual solution is to place selective 
excises on goods which are complementary to leisure. 
If the correct set of selective excises is chosen it 
is possible now to conceive of a selective tax on 
leisure and specific consumption which would be superior, 
on efficiency g:;.."ounds, to the VAT. 
Although this superior bundle of selective excises 
has been shown to be a theoretical possibility, it is 
not a very practical alternative because of obvious 
difficulties of definition, classification (with the 
attendant lobbying and stimulus to corruption) and 
administration. 
4.4. VAT REPLACING PROFITS TAX: 
The analysis thus far has been carried out in terms 
of a VAT replacing the selective sales taxes. If 
the introduction of a VAT were to be accompanied by 
a slight reduction in the company tax rate, the 
implications for efficiency are that there might be 
some stimulus to productivity, and it is possible 
that labour would be penalised. 
Professor Sadie (19701 5 has pointed out that in the 
case of a VAT replacing the profits tax, wages as 
well as profits will form the tax base in the place 
of profits alone, ·and that purchases of capital goods 
can be credited against tax liability. 
He makes it clear that capital intensive industries 
would be favoured over labour intensive industri~s. 
Now, it may be argued that this is a stimulus to 
efficiency because valuable labour resources cannot 
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be credited against tax liability in non profitable 
companies. In order to economise, these firms are 
forced to release the labour which is then employed 
in more profitable industries. However, this 
argument does assume that labour can move easily from 
one occupation to another. 
In the case of unskilled labour it probably does 
not matter whether the labourer is unskilled at one 
thing or unskilled at another. On the other hand 
labour cannot so readily be moved between jobs which 
require a certain amount of training. Nevertheless 
the tax is unlikely to be a major disincentive to 
the use of labour. Rather it is likely to be an 
incentive to the use of a different type of labour. 
If indeed there is a stimulus towards mechanisation, 
then labour will need to be trained to· operate the 
machines. Consequently there is more likely to be 
a shift from unskilled to semi skilled labour than 
any wholesale cut down in labour usage. 
EQUITY: 
4.5. THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE: 
The concept of justice in taxation has permeated the 
thinking of all tax authorities. Many have regarded 
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it as the most important of all tax principles. 
Equality was the first on the list of Adam Smith's 
• 6 maxims . S . 
7 t i· t f 11 "Q t. f imons pu as o ows: ues ions o 
relative collection cost,of stability and flexibility 
of yield are relevant of course but at the centre 
is the question of how the burden should be allocated, 
of what is the most equitable system". The Royal 
Canadian Commission on taxation 8 (1966 page 143) 
consistently gave the greatest weight to the equity 
of obj~ctive when faced with hard choices. They 
observed that "Unless the allocation of the burden 
is generally accepted as fair the social and political 
fabric of a country is weakened and can be destroyed. 
Should the burden be thought to be shared inequitably 
taxpayers will seek means to evade their taxes. When 
honesty is dismissed as stupidity, self assessment by 
taxpayers would be impossible and the cost of 
enforcement high" . 
We shall examine the justness of the VAT in terms 
of the two major principles of equity, the benefit 
and ability to pay principles. 
4. 6. THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE:-
The benefit approach is appealing for two major 
reasons. Firstly, many people regard it as fair 
that the beneficiaries of Government expenditure should 
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pay for these benefits via taxation in the proportion 
to which ·they benefit. The underlying rationale 
is that the Government acts like a large firm selling 
various social and merit goods. The second major 
attraction of the benefit approach is that it brings 
Government expenditure into the picture, whereas most 
approaches to equity tend to regard the payment 
of tax as an isolated act. 
A rigorous application of the benefit principle would 
require that there should be a simultaneous determination 
of the tax level and of the level of Government 
expenditure. 9 In the pure theory tax liability is 
determined on the basis of how much the consumer could 
be induced to pay by an omniscient despot. The 
taxpayer's willingness to pay would be determined by 
his desire for the social good and by his income. 
Now the VAT does not require the consumer to reveal 
his preference for social goods, but it can be thought 
of as encompasing some of the elements of the benefit 
theory, if it is combined with Government expenditure 
of a certain kind. 
If for example, the Government expenditure is 
concentrated in areas such as health, education and 
the provision of social security benefits, which· 
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tend to give greater benefit (in utility terms} 
to the poor, then it may be argued that the lower 
income groups who spend the greatest proportion of 
their incomes on consumption and therefore sacrifice 
most to the VAT, also receive most of its benefit. 
This is consistent with the benefit approach. 
4.7. ABILITY TO PAY: 
Horizontal equity is probably the most widely 
accepted principle of equity in taxation. H S . 10 · enry imons 
placed it above vertical equity in his later work. 
Musgrave on the other hand, argues that this is 
unjustified. He notes:- "If there is no specified 
reason for discriminating among unequals, how can there 
be a reason for avoiding discrimination among equals? 1111 • 
We shall take the view that both criteria are important 
and discuss the VAT in terms of each. In order to do 
this satisfactorily we shall need to define an index. 
of equality. 
4.8. THE INDEX OF EQUALITY: 
Equality may be defined in terms of ·income or 
consumption. Essentially the choice is a value 
judgment. Historically those who have favoured 
progressive taxation have also favoured an index based 
on income> but it is also possible for a tax on 
consumer expenditures to be applied at progressive 
rates. The main effective difference between the 
two is the treatment of saving. If the index is 
defined in terms of consumption then saving will be 
excluded, whereas if it is defined in terms of 
income, then saving will be included. Thus the old 
argument that income taxes involve a double taxation 
of saving really depends on the way the index of 
equality is defined. If the index is defined in 
terms of consumption, then a tax on income would 
subject savings to a double taxation. But if the 
index is defined in terms of income then the interest 
on saving is just another acretion and should 
rightfully be included in the base. 
The VAT may be regarded as a general tax on consumption. 
I'f the index is defined in terms of consumption, then 
the tax is equitable from the point of view of 
horizontal equity. With respect to vertical equity 
the VAT is proportional in terms of the consumption 
index. 
When related to the income base the VAT is somewha:t 
less equitable. In terms of horizontal equity it is 
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still superior to the selective sales taxes, but 
contains an element of inequity in that fainilies with 
similar incomes may have different consumption rates. 
This means that horizontal equity may be achieved more 
certainly through an income tax. The more usual 
objection to the VAT vis-a-vis income taxes is on 
vertical equity grounds. The regression occurs 
because consumption expenditure is usually a declining 
proportion of rising family income. 
4.94 THE DEGREE OP PROGRESSION~ 
The arguments in favour of progression related to the 
income index of equality are based upon a utilitarian 
interpretation of ability to pay. Individuals are 
assumed to have identical utility curves for income 
which display diminishing marginal utility. This 
theory favours the Pigou-Edgeworth principle of 
equal marginal sacrifice in order to achieve the 
objective of the maximisation of the sum of individual 
utilities. The only utilitarian qualification of 
this principle was in terms of the trade off between 
equity and efficiency. However, far more fundamental 
qualifications regarding the utility concept have 
been added since then. Atkinson13 (page 388) has 
distinguished two main lines of criticism:-
j 
1. That the minimum sacrifice theory takes no account 
of- the possible disincentive effective of taxation. 
2. That the underlying utilitarian framework.is 
inadequate. 
We shall consider these points in reverse order, 
beginning with some of the objections to the utility 
approach. 
Firstly, the new welfare economics does not accept 
interpersonal utility comparisons. The reasoning 
is that since people have different tastes it would 
be easy, for example, to find two people who had the 
same income, yet one showed little desire for more 
money while the other would incur great risk or 
discomfort to earn more. - Evidently the two people 
have different marginal utilities of income. Secondly, 
h . A I 14 • t' . "-b·1·t t ere is rrow s very interes ing 1mposs1 l l y 
theorem (page 130) which questions the principle of 
collective rationality. He uses an example first noted 
by the Marquis de Condorset which illustrates a 
situation in which there is no transitivity of choice: 
"There are three alternatives X, Y and Z among which 
choice is to be made. One third of the voters prefer 
X to Y and Y to Z. One third prefer Y to Z and Z to. X 
and one third prefer Z to X and X to Y. Then X will 
be preferred to Y by a m~jority, Y to Z by a majority 
and Z to X by a majority. " Clearly, lack of 
transitivity of choice would invalidate the entire 
indifference curve analysis. The question of the 
influence of taxation on the work leisure choice 
has come back into vogue following the work by 
Mirrlees (1971)
15 
but it had already been clearly 
recognised by Sidgwick (quoted in Edgeworth) 16 who 
wrote: "It is conceivable that a greater equality 
in the distribution of produce would lead ultimately 
to a reduction in the total amount to be distributed 
in consequence of a general preference of leisure 
to the results of labour". Nevertheless, the works 
of Mirrlees have drawn attention again to the fact 
that the introduction of the work leisure choice 
greatly complicates the solution. Al though he has 
not been able to derive an optimal tax structure, 
he has developed some unexpected conclusions. For 
instance it may be optimal for some of the population 
to remain idle and "marginal tax rates are rather 
low and tend to fall rather than rise with the level 
17 of income," Thus the optimal tax structure 
·may in fact be far less progressive than it would 
seem to be superficially • 
. 4 .10. CONCLUSIONS: 
It is possible to provide theoretical justification for 
the VAT in terms of the trade-off between equity and 
efficiency. One may adopt the approach that 
the VAT's advantages of neutrality and horizontal 
equity outweigh whatever loss there may be in terms 
of vertical equity. Yet it is important to note 
that deeper analysis reveals situations in which these 
assumptions may not hold. Questions of efficiency 
are complicated by the existence of multiple choice 
and decisions regarding equity are basically subjective 
value judgments. Furthermore, the tax cannot be 
viewed in isolation from the use to which the money 
is put. 
In the view of the author the VAT would indeed be 
justifiable in South Africa on condition that the base 
were so constituted as to be as neutral and horizontally 
equitable as is feasible and on condition that the 
requisite benefit expenditure were undertaken to offset 
a certain amount of regression. However, the 
author recognises that his view must in the end be 
based on certain subjective attitudes to the relative 
importance of efficiency and horizontal and vertical 
equity, which may not be shared by the community. 
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C H A P T E R 5. 
SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE 
5.1. FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE INCIDENCE: 
The discussion thus far has assumed that the VAT is 
shifted forward to the consumer through a rise in the 
prices of consumption goods. Therefore, although the 
I 
formal incidence (using Hick's 1 terminology) is upon 
the business firms who actually pay the tax, the 
effective incidence is upon the consumer and the VAT 
may be regarded as a general tax on consumption. This 
assumption is in accordance with conventional academic 
opinion although there are those such as Ture (1972) 2 
who feel that the tax is more likely to be shifted back 
to the factors of production. Tait (1972) 3 makes the 
point that shifting in a macro economic sense can 
become so diffuse as to be almost meaningless. "If 
the prices of consumer goods rise, consumer incomes 
rise sufficiently to maintain their previous real 
consumption, then the shifting of the tax starts to 
depend on things like the unused resources irt the 
economy, the money supply, trade union power etc,". 
-
"In general, it is almost impossible to isolate · 
the effects of a givert tax change. In the theoretical 
world, so many other variables must be taken into 
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account, e.g. the use to which Government revenue is 
put, the degree of money illusion, other relative 
price changes and Government monetary policy (Due 1963)
4
. 
The real world is even more complicated, containing 
variables and relationships between those variables 
which are only approximated by theory. 
In spite of the difficulty of determining the ultimate 
1ncidence of the tax, there is a strong concensus 
that at least partially, the general sales tax is 
shifted.forward. 
5.2. THE SHIFTING MECHANISM: 
The shifting of the sales tax onto price is supposed 
to operate by increasing the marginal costs of the 
firm. This makes some production unprofitable at 
current prices and output is reduced. By reducing 
output the entrepreneur frees resources for Government 
use but the demand curve for consumer goods is meant 
to remain the same. With the reduced supply this 
leads to an increase in price (Sullivan, Page 261) 5 . 
The results are similar under imperfect competition 
where businessmen "with the use of average cost 
techniques are expected to raise prices by the amount 
of the tax". (Due, quoted in Sullivan) 6 . 
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5. 3~ PROflTS TAXE.$' 
Traditional theory holds that in the short run a 
profits tax will not affect optimum output under 
conditions of monopoly or perfect competition, 
and there will be no shifting. Under perfect 
competition the firm is a price taker in the short 
run so no increase in price is possible. In the 
case of the monopolist, pretax equilibrium is 
undisturbed by the tax. This is because neither 
the margipal revenue nor marginal cost curves which 
are the determinants of profit maximising output. 
and price are affected by the tax. The tax merely 
divides the profit between the Government and the 
firm. 
However, this marginal cost approach to pricing has 
been received with some skepticism by businessmen 
who claim to set their prices on the "cost plus" system. 
If the "cost plus" system is used then the tax may 
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AC lS the average cost curve of the firm. ACl includes 
the markup and AC2 ·includes the tax. After tax the 
firm increases its price so as to maintain the .. 
before tax markup such that RV = vw = ST. The result 
of this policy is that the incidence is shared by the 
consumer who pays a price of P2 which is higher than 
Pl and by the firm in reduced output from Ql to Q2. 
Clearly there will be even more shifting if businessmen 
adopt a "cost plus a percentage" approach to pric~ng. 
5.4. THE EXTENT OP SHIFTING; 
Given that shifting occurs in the case of a 
particular tax, the amount of the shift will depend 
on the elasticity of the various cost and revenue 
schedules. Clearly, in the case of a general sales 
tax, the greater the elasticity of demand, and the less 
the elasticity of supply, the less the firms will 
shift the tax onto the consumer. Conversely a less 
elastic demand and more elastic supply will give rise 
to greater shifting. 
In South Africa the VAT would replace a selective 
sales tax. Because of the wider base, demand would 
be less effected by the availability of substitutes 
and consequently there should be greater shifting 
of the tax. To the extent that the VAT allows for 
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a reduction in profits taxes it may also give rise 
to further shifting. However, this is uncertain 
and will remain so until we are able to determine the 
extent to which profits taxes are passed on in South 
Africa. 
5.5. EMPIRICAL STUDIES~ 
Most of the empirical studies have tended to confirm 
the argument that there is some forward shifting 
of the VAT. However, there have been different results 
regarding the nature and extent 9f the incidence. 
Bronfenbrenner (19601 7 for example has arg~ed that 
shifting under the VAT is slower than for other 
sales taxes. In Europe there has usually been some 
rise in prices following the introduction of the VAT 
but it is difficult to isolate that part of the price 
rise which is due to the shifting of the tax. In 
Denmark and the Netherlands, there w2re sharp price 
increases which were definitely attributed to the 
. 5 
introduction of the VAT (N.E.D.O. Report 1969) • 
The Germans on the other hand, experienced no 
noticeable price rise at all. The overall price 
increase of 0,9% in the six months to July 1968, after 
the introduction of VAT, is believed to have been caused 
by other factors and the effect of the VAT may 
~ 
actually have been a price because it replaced the 
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cascade tax. This serves to highlight the fact that 
shifting and incidence are relative as well as 
absolute phenomena. Relative to the cascade taxes 
which it replaced in Germany the VAT seems to have 
shown less shifting. The price impact is likely to 
be greatest in countries where the VAT is part of a 
complete change over from direct and indirect taxes 
which would not of course be the case in South Africa 
which has already begun to move towards an indirect 
system. 
The shifting of the profits taxes has come in for 
a lot of empirical examination recently, but there 
have been conflicting results and the controversy is 
still not resolved. Studies by Kryzniak & Musgrave 9 
(1963) and Laumas10 have tended to indicate extensive 
shifting of corporation taxes in America and India. 
On the other hand Gordon (1967) 11 has found evidence 
of zero shifting. 
CONCLUSION: 
The only firm conclusion that can be drawn about 
shifting and incidence for South Africa, is that 
the VAT is likely to be shifted more than the selective 
sales taxes. The marginal increase in regression 
which arises from the greater shifting must then be 
viewed in terms of the equity-efficiency trade off 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
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As rega~ds the profits tax, some shifting is likely 
but empirical work overseas has yielded conflicting 
results and we cannot be sure whether there would be 
more shifting under the VAT or the Profits Tax. 
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CH A P T E R 6. 
S T A B I L I Z A T I 0 N 
CONSUMPTION ASPECTS 
6.1. VAT AND OTHER SALES TAXES~ 
The essential weakness of the selective sales tax 
(currently operating in South Africa) as a means of 
regulating overall demand in the economy, is that its 
action may be offset by substitution. Thus an 
increase in the tax will not necessarily lead to a 
decline in total consumption in real terms, yet it 
will discriminate heavily against certain industries. 
The VAT, being a general sales tax, is neutral between 
commodities leaving only the choice between present and 
future consumption. 
If people decide to save more as a result of a tax 
increase this will reduce aggregate demand thus 
achieving the objective of the tax increase. Conversely 
a tax cut should increase aggregate demand. Of course 
this neutrality would apply to any general sales tax 
and is not unique to the VAT. 
Another advantage of the VAT as a discretionary tool 
is the speed of reaction. The immediate impact of .any 
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adjustment will be far wider than it would be under 
any other sales tax because of the broader VAT base. 
The VAT would also be a more powerful control weapon 
than existing South African sales taxes because of 
the wide effect on company liquidity. Taxes have 
to be paid as they are accrued although they may not 
yet have been realised because the trade credit 
period may be longer than the lag in tax payments. 
Consequently any changes in rates would have an 
immediate effect on company liquidity. Of course 
the maximum benefit from the utilisation of this 
relationship will only be derived through the close 
co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policy. 
6. 2. INDIRECT . VS. DIRECT TAXES: 
The relative efficiencies of the direct and indirect 
taxes as fiscal weapons will be carried out via a. 
comparison of the "tax multipliers". Assuming, 
for simplicity, a closed economy ~ithout indirect 
taxes or transfers, fixed government spending, and 
with a consumption function (C) of the form 
C = a + c (Y - Ty) 
where a is an arbitrary constant, C is the marginal 
propensity to consume, Y is national income and Ty is 
tax revenue. 
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Now given the equilibrium condition 
Y ·~ C + 1 + G 
it may be shown that 
= -c 
~Ty 1-c 
which is the "Income-tax Multiplier". 1 
The "Rate-of-Tax Multiplier" at a uniform proportional 
rate may be shown to be smaller than the abov.e 
multiplier and the multiplier for a progressive rate 
may be shown to be yet smaller2 • The implication 
is that progressive taxes would be the most effective 
automatic stabilisers among the direct taxes and 
conversely the weakest discretionary weapon. 
The "Indirect Tax Multiplier" for a proportional 







This multiplier is larger than the income tax 
multiplier on page 77 and may be interpreted 
to mean that indirect tax adjustments would be 
better discretionary tools than direct taxes. 
However, a consumption function of the form 
c a + cY 
may yield a different result. If the autonomous 
element refers to a given quantity of goods, its 
value will rise with the price increase brought about 
by the increased indirect taxation. The new multiplier 
would depend on the value of a. If a is very large 
this could tend to neutralise the effect of a tax 
change on consumption. 
The most recent .formulation of the consumption 
function for South Africa was published by Van 
Rensburg in 1973 4 The relationship he found 
was: 
C = -0,0031 + 0,88 Yd. 
The autonomous element in this function is small, which 
means that its potentially neutralising effect is minimised. 
This implies that indirect taxes should be good regulators 
in the South African economy. 
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INVESTMENT ASPECTS 
6. 3. AN INVESTMENT FUNCTION~-
The theory of investment is highly controversial.· 
A number of investment functions have been put forward 
but none have been found to be entirely satisfactory. 
The author has performed a simple correlation analysis 
between changes in absolute disposable income and 
private investment in South Africa from 1946 to 
1970. 
The purpose was to test whether there was any simple 
relationship of the marginal proponsity type found 
for consumption and disposable income by Van Rensburg. 
The results of the test are presented here, while 
the data and calculations may be found in Appendix I. 
The sample correlation coefficient was r 
and the coeff:~cient of d.etermination r 2 = 
0, 515 30 
0,26319 
Thus the association in the sample seemed rather low 
and the use of the Z transform yield a value of 0,1244 
well below the 1,96 which is the critical value at a 
5 % significance level where Z is normc3.lly distributed, 
tending to confirm the lack of correlation in the 
variables. This lack of a significant correlation 
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implies that whatever functional relationship does 
exist, must be of a more subtle nature. 
We shall not perform similar tests on all of the 
other variables which may determine investment. Yet 
clearly we need some sort of a general model which 
incorporates at least the more important factors such 
as profits, rate of interest, capital stocks and 
expectations. Let us begin then with the general 
principle that where funds are available they should 
be invested only if the present value (P.V.) of the 
return discounted by the cost of capital to the 
investor exceeds the P.V. of the outlay. 
6.4. AN INVESTMENT MODEL: 
Where the investors are certain of costs and returns 
the simple marginal efficiency type investment function 
is adequate. Thus we may say that a time stream 
of capital costs cl ... c2 Ct over t years 
yielding a revenue stream A1 ... A2 
... An over n 
years has a net present value (N.P.V.). 
N.P.V. 
and investment will be undertaken where the N.P.V. 
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i.s positive. The value of r in the formula reflects 
the costs of capital and will be related to the market 
rate of interest. The values of A will depend on 
profits and the allowances for depreciation accepted 
by the Receiver of Revenue. 
The application of a VAT to this simplified model 
yields interesting results. In as much as VAT 
collections are effected quarterly as against yearly 
profits tax collections 1the reduction in cash flow 
due to an increase in the VAT would occur at an 
earlier point in the series than for profits tax 
and would thus be more heavily discounted. The 
earlier impact on liquidity would also react upon the 
rate of interest leading to a higher cost of capital 
for discounting. Thus the profit and liquidity 
effects of a VAT on investment would make it a 
speedy regulator which is consistent with the earlier 
conclusion regarding consumption effects. However, 
cash flows are made up of depreciation as well as 
profits and the instantaneous depreciation allowed 
under the VAT has potentially destabilising effects 
on investment. 
Consider an increase in the rate of VAT for stabili-
sat ion reasons. One way in which investors could 
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maintain their cash flows would be simply to 
increase their depreciation allowances by embarking 
on new irivestment. 
If the VAT were to become a regular cyclical dampener 
sophisticated investors would recognise the tempora-
riness of high rates and would take advantage of 
depreciation allowances at precisely the time when 
the authorities are trying to cut back on investment. 
We are presented thus with the spectre of investment 
not only failing to respond to treatment but wilfully 
doing its own thing and at any moment it may just 
break off into the wild blue yonder. 
All is not lost. There are two potential forces to 
-counter this counter effect. Firstly, assuming 
that investors do take advantage of temporarily high 
rates of tax to invest, this will place a further 
strain on liquidity in the economy and eventually 
firms will be faced with capital rationing. Further-
more restrictive Fiscal Policy is likely to be tied 
to a tighter Monetary Policy which will serve to 
reinforce this effect. Secondly, a policy of 
increased investment in the face of higher tax rates 
would assume that market elasticities are such as 
to absorb the price increase, as well as the increased 
-· 8 3 ~ 
output. 
Overall market demand is unlikely to be perfectly 
inelastic, however, and consequently there should 
be some fall off in demand with the increase in 
prices. This will serve as a disincentive to invest. 
6.5. INSTANTANEOUS DEPRECIATION: 
Our discussion of the ·potentially destabilising effect 
of the VAT for investment has aS$Umed that an 
irrunediate cash refund is allowed. The German and 
Dutch systems do in fact work this way (for credits 
in excess of a certain minimum limit) but the Italian 
and French operate buffer systems which complicate 
h 
. 5 t e issue . The French "Decalage" introduces a one 
month lagged effect and the lag in the "Butoir" is 
f . . d6 o uncertain perio We shall continue with our 
assumption, however, as it is proposed that the 
South African system should be similar to those of 
Germany and Holland permitting instantaneous deprecia-
tion because of the neutrality advantage. 
The essence of the neutrality condition is that 
investments which have the same internal rate of 
discount before the tax should also have the same 
internal rate after the tax. This means that the 
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effect of tax rate will be identical for different 
investments where the internal rates are reduced 
by the same fraction. It may be shown b~ recourse 
to worked examples (the problem does not lend 
itself to simple mathematical solution), that a 




6.6. COSTS AND RETURNS ARE UNCERTAIN: 
The standard method according to which investment 
criteria are modified to take account of uncertainty 
is the introduction of some stringency into the 
condition for acceptance. For example the M.P.V. 
technique used above, may be adjusted by the addition 
of a risk premium to the cost of capital used in the 
discounting process. Examination of the underlying 
formula shows that this accounts for uncertainty 
in the return but not in the outlay. 
formula 




p = A (1 + 
present value 
cash return 
discount rate per 
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Now if the uncertainty is in respect of the outlay 
when the outlay is incurred before the return 
as is often the case, then t = O. Clearly 
adjustments in the discount rate will not alter the 
value of P in this case. 
This problem is overcome by the use of certainty 
equivalents which discount the expected cash flows 
at the cost of capital rate and then convert the 
N.P.V. to a certainty equivalent. 
Both the risk premium and certainty equivalent 
techniques assume risk aversion among investors. 
Where the risk premium approach is used there is 
the problem of deciding just how risk averse investors 
are, for this will determine the added discount whey 
they deem necessary to account for the uncertainty. 
If on the other hand, the certainty equivalent 
technique i3 employed, the market rate of interest 
may be used for discounting but again one needs to 
know how the investor will effect the trade off 
between risk and return when converting the resultant 
N.P.V.to its certainty equivalent value. This 
problem is conveniently handled by the time honoured 
economic technique of assumption. We shall assume 
that investors are risk averse, and show their 
correspondingly "concave down" type indifference curves. 
The Markowitz
8 
analysis for a full portfolio of 
investments which reduces to the same problem of a 
risk return trade-off is quite elegant looking and 
has become very popular in investment literature 






The efficiency frontier represents the optimum set 
of combinations of risk and return. Clearly any 
combination which is not on the lower right quadrant 
of the set of available combinations is sub-optimal 
as a shift ·to the right would increase return while 
leaving risk unaltered. Similarly a shift downwards 
would decrease risk while leaving return unchanged. 
The shape of the indifference curves Il and I2 
follows upon the assumption of diminishing marginal 
utility and optimal investment occurs at the point 
of t arigency of the highest indifference curve with 
the efficiency frontier. 
The introduction of a tax will shift the efficiency 
frontier to the left since for the same amount of 
risk there will be correspondingly lower returns. 
The initial drop from curve Il to I2 is unlikely 
to represent a final position since the investor may 
attain the higher indifference curve I3 by moving 
along the new efficiency frontier Er! What we have 
here is an income - substitution effect similar tv 
that which occurs in the Leisure -Income trade off. 
It seems that instead of a total substitution of 
less risk for less income the investor would want 
to recover some of the past income by assuming more 
risk. Whether the income or substitution effect is 
greater is indeterminate. A further complication 
arises if the tax increases uncertainty per se. For 
example an increased VAT may make an investor more 
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uncertain of the ability of the market to absorb 
increased output because of his expectation of a slow 
down in the economy. This would shift the indifference 
curve further to the left reinforcing the substitution 
effect. If this is powerful enough there will be 
no net income effect at all. 
Now as long as there is no net income effect, 
investment may be said .to be well behaved since an 
increase in tax will lead to a decrease in investment, 
thereby facilitating our control of the economy. 
However, a noticeable income effect would mean that 
investment was just as badly behaved in the face of 
uncertainty as it was found to be where investors 
take advantage of the credit mechanism to increase 
investment upon an increase in taxes. 
6.7. THE TREATMENT OF INTEREST COST: 
The tax treatment of interest cost also has a 
bearing upon the willingness of investors to assume 
risk. In South Africa interest cost may be deducted 
in determining net income for tax purposes. This 
makes debt financing more attractive vis-a~vis 
equity financing. We shall not state that the optimal 
capital structure is altered since that would draw 
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us into the Modigliani-Miller controversy but we 
shall assume that this tends to increase the share 
(however marginally} of debt in the capital structure. 
Banks are known to be reticent about granting credit 
for risky ventures and the implication is that this 
increased use of debt on the part of investors leads 
to the rejection of more risky projects. 
The VAT, however, appears to be neutral with respect 
to capital structures as there is no offset of 
interest cost. Thus the VAT would favour neither 
debt nor equity. If there is an all or nothing choice 
between VAT and the profits tax the VAT should be 
the system more favourable to risk taking. The 
proposed system for South Africa would not eliminate 
profits taxes, however, with the result that this 
bias towards risk aversion is likely to remain. 
6.8. THE MODEL IN THE ABSENCE OF RISK AVERSION: 
Thus far it has been assumed that investors are 
averse to risk taking. This assumption enabled us 
to develop indifference curves from the the 
inferences regarding substitution and income effects 
were drawn. However, if people were not risk averse 
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the indifference curves would not bend to the right 
and there would be no substitution effect. In this 
case investment would be all the more likely to be 
badly behaved and the response to a tax increase 
would be one of increased investment from the income 
effect. Let us therefore examine the assumption 
of diminishing marginal utility upon which the belief 
in risk aversion stands. 
Friedman
9 
has developed a function G(B) which gives 
the "utility" of various probability distributions 
of income. (Where B stands for a "bundle" of 
alternative incomes and associated probabilities). 
In its general form the theory depends only a 
supposed consistency and transitivity of choice. 
Even these assumptions will be questioned later, but 
for the moment they will be accepted. The theory 
is given further content with the delimination of a 
special hypothesis. 
G(B) = p F (I) 
Where P represents the probabilities of various incomes 
and F(I) is the function of income. He then draws an 
F(I) function to be "capable of accounting for most 


























Region B is the one of particular interest to us for 
it shows a zone in which there is risk taking. The 
existence of this region is said to account for the 
phenomenon of gambling> where people may pref er the 
small chance of a large win to the large chance of a 
small loss~ There is no sure way of saying whether 
investors will be in a region A, B or C at the time 
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when the tax is imposed and clearly, therefore, it 
is never certain whether investors will react by 
risk aversion or by risk taking in a given situation. 
The very fundamentals of utility theory have been 
questioned by Ri vett10 who question-; both the 
consistency of choice and the transitivity axiom 
(Von Neumann and Morgansterns second axiom). This 
criticism goes far deeper than a mere questioning 
of our ability to control investment. It is in 
fact a questioning of the rationality of choice and 
of our ability to control it via stabilisation policy 
or for that matter any other policy. While the 
question is interesting and serves to highlight the 
inter-disciplinary nature of profound economic thought, 
it will be developed no further since this thesis 
must limit itself to a fairly specific analysis of 
the implications of the VAT. 
6.9. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT: 
The conclusion which begins to emerge from the 
preceeding discussion is that the VAT would be far 
less reliable in its effects on investment than its 
effects on consumption~ The existence of an income 
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effect would imply that taxation would increase rather 
than reduce the level of investment in the economy. 
In the specific case of the VAT this effect would be 
intensified by the operation of the credit mechanism. 
However, these results are subject to a number of 
major qualifications. Firstly, the available theories. 
of investment are inadequate because they break down 
under uncertainty, .yielding indeterminacies. Then 
the existence of an income effect may be called. into 
question where decision taking in joint stock companies 
is divorced from ownership. Here risk aversion could 
could be a prime motive since shareholders can easily 
spot the failures among directors' investment 
commitments but are unable to assess the opportunity 
cost of projects which were refused. 
Finally, if liquidity and the availability of funds 
are important determinants of investment the above 
conclusions.would be neutralised. Only the impact 
value of the VAT which would apply more to consumption 
and liquidity owing to the longer "gestation" period 
of investment decisions may be said to have a high 
probability of being "well bahaved", the medium and 
long term effects are uncertain. When we begin 
to separate the impact value of discretionary policy 
from its wider ramifications we are introd~cing -a 
time dimension into the analyses. This dynamic 
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approach is at once more realistic and more difficult 
than the static framework we have relied on thus far. 
The next section discusses the feasibility of extending 
our earlier results to develop dynamic conclusions. 
DYNAMIC ASPECTS 
6.10. TIME PATHS AND THE PROBLEM OF LAGS: 
The essential element in a dynamic study is time. The 
time path drawn out by the economy as it moves from one 
equilibrium to another must be understood before it is 
possible to predict the outcome of an adjustment in any 
exog~nous variable. This point is illustrated in the 
phase diagram which appears below. 
Suppose that GNP is fluctuating as depicted in the 
diagram. Odd values tl, t3, t5 ..... · t2n + 1 
represent the troughs and even values t2' t4- .... t2n 
represent the peaks. A policy designed to curb 
the upswing between tl and t2 would need to take 
effect before t2 or it would accentuate the downswing 
between t2 and t3 causing a more violent oscillation 
than that which would have occured if the system had 
simply been left to itself. In order to minimise 
the danger of instability from this source it is 
necessary to cut down as much as possible on the 
lags inherent in the system. 
LAG TYPE 1: 
RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR STABILISATION MEASURES: 
Forecasting errors and the time taken to assemble 
and process data may give rise to diagnoses which 
are both untimely and wrong. The VAT could serve 
as a means of improving the quality of statistical 
data. Until now South African experience has 
shown that.the many statistical indicators needed 
to pinpoint shifts in the movement of the economy 
take rather long to be published when they are 
available. In addition, none of the indicators, 
with the possible exception of the stock market, 
seem to provide reliable early warning of turning 
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points in booms and depressions. Even the stock 
market shows an uncertain trend as there is seldom 
a way of discerning early on whether a reversal 
represents a "technical correction" in an otherwise 
secular trend, or whether it is the next phase of 
the Business Cycle of which the trend was only a 
part. 
LAG TYPE 2: 
DECISION TIME: 
Once the analyst has recognised the need for action, 
there is a further time lag in getting the authorities 
to agree on a policy. ' The VAT may be of some help 
in decreasing this lag since it is a truly general 
tax. In most countries, probably including 
South Africa, there are "lobbies" of vested interests 
close to the seat of power. When a tax change is 
proposed which may be detrimental to various groups, 
much time may be wasted in pacifying and perhaps 
arranging compromises with the offended groups. In 
the case of a general tax this is less likely to 
happen as all are affected equally. This smaller 
decision lag is also an advantage of using tax 
adjustments rather than adjustments in expenditure. 
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Large expenditure programs such as the Orange River 
projects and Saldanha Bay need to be planned well in 
advance and even smaller projects such as the building 
of a National Monument cannot be started and stopped 
at will. 
LAG TYPE 3:' 
TIME LAG IN TAKING EFFECT: 
It has already been pointed out that the VAT has 
a very speedy reaction time because of its broad base 
and because collections occur at periods of less than 
a year. This would be an advantage in cutting down 
the lag between the adjustment and change in 
disposable income but it would do nothing about the 
lag between the receipt of income by the consumer 
spending and production undertaken to meet consumer 
spending (the Lundberg lag) 11 • 
Although the VAT has the impact advantage, its 
total effect after working through the successive 
multiplier rounds is far less certain, especially 
in view of the possibly perverse effect of the export 
and investment mechanisms. 
The problem of lags has been tackled basically in 
two ways. Firstly, there have been attempts to 
build econometrip models which would incorporate 
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the lags and enable the policy maker to simulate 
the overall effect of any intended fiscal measure. 
These models have proved difficult to build because 
of the vast number of variables involved. Not only 
do the lags need to be identified and measured but 
the relationships between all the variables need to 
be specified as well. 
In defining the structure of the economic system, 
the question of causality has been particularly 
difficult to_ settle. Relationships between variables 
established from historical data may be transitory or 
even accidental. 
Even if we accept that two variables A and B are 
related, this does not necessarily mean that a 
change in A causes a change in B because there may 
be a third variable and which is the real cause of the 
change in B, yet C may not have been accounted for in 
the model. Uncertainty in regard to causality makes 
it very difficult to build models which accurately 
describe the relationships between past events, let 
alone models which are able to predict the future. 
Nevertheless models have been built on which fairly 
useful simulations have been performed. Perhaps 
the most powerful and general result of these 
simulations has been the discovery that for long 
period models the lags tend to be relatively un-
important. H 12 . . h d" h" h ansen mentions eig t stu ies w ic 
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support this view. 
Simulations on the Brookings Institute model, 
the Federal Reserve ~ MIT model and the Klein 
Goldberger model for the United States showed that 
between 70 and 100 percent of the effects of 
discretionary measures appear during the year after 
13 the change • 
The Dutch model built by the Central Plan Bureau 
of the Netherlands also gave a high proportion of 
the effects appearing during the first year. 
Simulations for the United Kingdom implied that 
about 90% of' the effect of a change in taxation or 
government expenditure appeared during the year 
14 after the change 
If this result turns out to be capable of generalisa-
tion then we have a userul bound on the likely 
period of lag type III. However, it may not 
always be feasible to enact the discretionary measures 
as long as a year before the peak in the cycle which 
we propose to control. Furthermore, we still have 
to contend with lags of type 1 and type 2. These 
factors alone would be sufficient to suggest the 
--
using of automatic stabilizers but there is another 
possibly more serious difficulty. The simulations 
assume that the economy starts off in a state of 
equilibrium and the moves dynamically towards another 
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state of equilibrium. The real world may not 
be that obliging and at the moment when the shock 
Ct.ax) is applied to the system it may be at a point 
on its dynamic path which the econometrist finds 
impossible to locate on his model. Let us consider 
then the second method of overcoming the problem of 
lags, which is to build automatic stabilizers into 
the system. 
6.11. AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS: 
Certain taxes, such as the progressive personal 
taxes rise and fall with income and so provide 
automatic damping to the cycle. From the previous 
section the advantages of such dampeners in 
eliminating lags are clearly evident. Let us consider, 
therefore, the potential of the VAT as one of these 
automatic stabilizers. 
On purely theoretical grounds the efficiency of the 
· VAT as an automatic stabilizer would depend on which 
taxes it replaced, and upon the assumptions regarding 
shifting. In South Africa, where it is likely to 
replace the selective sales taxes, it should prove 
to be a more efficient stabilizer because of its 
very wide base. With a widely based tax a given 
( 
- 101 ~ 
increase in national income would give rise to a 
greater increase in tax revenue, and a correspondingly 
smaller increase in disposable income than that which 
would occur where there was a narrower base. 
I:f on the other hand the VAT were to replace the 
profits taxes (wholly or partly) its automatic 
effects would be less certain. Eckstein15 has argued 
that VAT would be a weaker automatic stabilizer than 
the corporate income tax, since profits are more 
sensitive to a cyclical change than value added. 
16 . 
However, Oakland has· argued that thiE would depend 
on how the taxes are shifted. Among the possible 
situations which he suggests is the case where VAT 
is shifted and the economy is at full employment. 
He argues that this could be a situation in which the 
VAT would give greater stability than the corporate 
profits tax. 
Besides the logical developments, there have also 
been many empirical attempts to measure the efficiency 
of the automatic stabilizers. We shall refer to 
some of the results of this work in the next section, 
but first let us consider the methods which have been 
used to do these measurements. Many of the static 
methods for measuring the efficiency of the stabilizers 
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h b b . d th M l 
7 ff°' ~ ave een ase on e usgrave coe · icient. 
This coefficient (r) gives the proportion of the 
change in income that is prevented by the operation 
of the built in stabilizers. It is defined as: 
T = 
c E t (To/Yo) 
1 - c Cl - E t (To/Yo)) 
where c = Marginal propensity to consume, Et is 
the elasticity of the stabilizer with respect to 
changes in national income and (Yo/To) is the average 
tax yield in the initial period. The advantage of 
this formulation stems from the fact that the product 
Et (To/Yo) is equal to the effective marginal tax 
rate AT/AY and, therefore, the coefficient may be 
estimated without first calculatin~ the elasti6ity 
or average tax. 
However, an adjustment must be made for the effects 
of discretionary fiscal policy or the coefficient 
is likely to be over or underestimated. Modifications 
of this coefficient have been used in a number of 
researches including the measurement of automatic 
s:tabilisation quoted in section 6.12 below. Now it 
may be considered a serious deficiency to use a 
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static measure because although lags of type 1 
and type 2 should not occur in the case of automatic 
stabilizers, this would assume that the type 3 lags. 
are as short as the period of the model. In fact 
empirical work
18 
has shown this to be a fairly 
reasonable assumption and it will be accepted in this 
work. However, there are other shortcomings of 
static analysis which have stimulated work on 
dynamic measurement models 19 . 
Briefly, these are as follows ~ 
Firstly static analysis compares equilibrium 
situations which may not exist once time enters the 
analysis. Secondly, static analysis takes no 
account of the speed nor the actual path of the 
adjustment in income which is induced by the stabilizer. 
These problems have to some extent been overcome in 
the sophisticated model built recently by Balopoulus 20 
for the British economy. Like the static models it 
depends partly on the elasticity of various taxes 
with respect of National Income but it also depends 
on long and short run dynamic multipliers. The 
smaller the multiplier, the greater the automatic 
stabilizing power of the tax. Although we shall 
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have to be content with static measures of the VAT 
for the time being, we have here a glimpse of the 
direction of future research in the. area. Now that 
Britain is on the VAT it is quite likely that 
simulations for the VAT will be performed on this 
model in the near future. 
6.12. EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE OF VAT AS A STABILIZER: 
h E . s d 21 . • 1 1 . f 1 T e uropa Institute tu y is particu ar y use u 
as a measure of discretionary effects of the VAT 
since most measurement models do not go so far as 
to isolate VAT from the other indirect effects. The 
effects on Prices, Consumption, Overall Demand, 
Production and Employment are shown in the tables 
in Appendix II. The VAT effect is isolated in the 
first of each of the three columns, in Tables 5, 7, 
8, 9 and 10 of the study (Appendix II). 
There is a downward response to an increased tax 
for all of the indices except prices of consumer 
goods, (Tableau _7} which vary positively with the tax 
as would be expected. The building industry is 
·something of a non-conformist in the tables, but 
not enough to upset the overall result. 
After our earlier discussion of the potentially 












is reassuring, but it should be remembered that 
the simulations were carried out within the limits 
of a basically historical model. The investment· 
aberration which we are.afraid of would be more 
likely to occur in the future when businessmen have 
come to understand the VAT well enough to take 
advantage of its peculiarities. 
22 The OECD report gives the following comparison:-
STABILIZATION OF GNP--GROWTH AROUND THE TREND 




















1955-65 31 21 5 16 
1958-65 12 13 -35 48 
1955-65 35 23 
1958-65 42 15 27 26 14 12 
1955-65 31 16 
1956-65 30 15 -17 32 
1955-65 31 14 17 5 
1955-65 -11 -13 -10 -3 
1955-65 56 49 17 32 
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1. Measured on non-agricultural GNP at market prices. 
2. Not including public enterprise investment. 
3. Measured on non-agricultural GDP at factor cost. 
4. Social security included in Central government. 
A value of 100 has been assigned to perfect stabilization, 
0 where there is no stabilization, and negative values 
where the effects are destabilizing. It is noticeable 
that among the countries compared, France has shown by 
far the greatest degree of automatic stabilization. 
So much so that the effects of strongly destabilizing 
discretionary measures have been offset sufficiently 
to produce a stabilizing overall effect. Now how much 
of this automatic effect can be attributed.to the V.A.T.? 
This depends on the marginal response rates and elastici-
ties of the tax and social security systems. The 
23 elasticities of tax revenue were found to be high 
for both direct and indirect taxes. However, the OECD 
were not able to obtain the estimates of discretionary 
changes in social security which were needed to derive 
the automatic changes. This is a pity, since the social 
security system would undoubtedly be a major contributor 
to automatic stabilization. Nevertheless, the high 
elasticity of indirect tax, of which V.A.T. is a large 
proportion, would indicate that the V.A.T. has indeed 
proved to be a good automatic stabilizer. 
6.13 
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APPLICATION TO SOUTH AFRICA: 
There are a number of reasons why-the automatic 
stability of the French V.A.T. may not work as well for 
South Africa. Firstly, the low income elasticity 
commodities, alcohol and tobacco, which accounted 
for just under 10% of indirect tax revenue for France 
in the OECD study
24 
play a far more important role in 
South Africa. In 1972/73 excises on these commodities 
mad.e up more than 40% of South Africa Is indirect tax 
collections.
25 
If the Government were prepared to 
reduce the excises on these commodities when introducing 
the V.A.T. - and the V.A.T. would provide sufficient 
revenue for this to be possible, then the V.A.T. would 
increase the stabilizing potential of the indirect system. 
In the more likely event of the excises being retained, 
the V.A.T. would be less stabilizing than it. is in 
France. 
Secondly, the French V.A.T. extends to the service 
sector, but in South Africa this would probably not be 
the case, for some time, because of the administrative 
difficulties. 
Another characteristic of the French V.A.T. which is 
unlikely to be adopted for administrative reasons, is 
the system of multiple rates, ·which again could be a 
factor in the high income elasticity of the tax. 
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Finally, the importance of social security in the 
French system should not be overlooked. In France 
the tax and social security systems complement each 
other as automatic stabilizers, whereas in South 
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CH APTER 7. 
ADM IN.IS TR AT I 0 N. 
7.1 THE NUMBER OF COLLECTION POINTS: 
The Value Added Tax has the widest base among sales 
taxes and also the greatest number of collection 
points. Thus the collection and inspection of the 
tax are normally more costly than for other forms 
of taxation. 
Inspection is particularly costly under the indirect 
subtractive method where inspectors are sent out to 
check the validity of all the invoices. This problem 
becomes more acute as the frequency of collection 
increases. One way to lessen the burden of inspection 
is to adopt the accounts system rather than the 
invoicing system. Alternatively, one could streamline 
the method of collection and inspection as has been 
done in Germany. 1 Basically, the Germans have adopted 
the principle of self assessment. Every month the 
German tax-payer assesses himself and pays ove~ the 
required amount to the authorities. His personal 
assessment is then checked at the time of the annual 
audit of the 0ompany's accounts for profits tax liability 
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Security is reinforced by the system of spot 
checks from time to time by inspectors of the 
Government tax department. Clearly, such a system 
can reduce dramatically the cost of inspection which 
may now be carried out at far less frequent intervals. 
The point to notice is that as long as collections 
are frequent (and not necessarily inspections), the 
benefits of short indirect tax periods will be retained. 
7.2 MULTIPLE RATES AND "CATCHING UP". 
The next major administrative problem arises from 
multiple rates. When one group of tax-payers is able 
to be classified at a lower rate than another there 
are always those who seek to be mis-classified. 
Furthermore, the definition of different classes of 
tax-payer usually gives rise to quite genuine cases of 
uncertainty. Clerly, this sort of differentiation 
increases the administrative burden of control. However, 
there is another probably. more serious problem which-
arises from different rates. This is the problem 
called 'catching up' which was mentioned in the section 
on the tax base. 
If the reduced rate is applied only in an intermediate 
stage in the. production and distribution process, as may 
be the case where a firm buys raw materials which are 
subject to a lower rate than it's own product, then the 
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benefit of the lower rate will not be passed on 
to the ultimate consumer. It will instead be passed. 
forward by the tax-payer with whom it has 'caught up'. 
Furthermore, the actual VAT liability of later higher 
rated tax-payers would be increased. Finally, in 
situations where cash refunds are not allowed, the 
situation could be created where tax-payers whose 
inputs are taxed at higher rates than its outputs 
. 2 
would become permanent creditors of the state. 
The only way in which catching up can be completely 
eliminated under the iDdirect subtractive method of 
calculation, is to use a single rate. The case of 
zero rating for exports is not relevant because here 
the lower rate attaches to the final stage in the 
home process. 
7.3 THE BUFFER. 
The VAT credit mechanism can be administered either 
by means of a buffer (butoir) as in France, or by means 
of a cash refund. According to the buffer system, any 
credit which may arise because the VAT content of inputs 
exceeds that of outputs has to be offset against a 
liability as and when such liability arises. 
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This can lead to situations in which the State 
owes the tax payer money for long periods of time. 
Forced loans of this nature can hardly be considered 
equitable. This would discriminate against capital 
intensive industries which may be deprived of working 
capital because of their inabiiity to reclaim the VAT 
liability in their purchases. Again the situation 
is worse under systems of multiple rating. In such 
cases it is possible that a firm whose inputs are 
taxed at a higher rate than its outputs would never 
get a chance to recover its forced loan from the 
Government. 
The buffer system places a particular burden upon 
research companies. These companies often have very 
small turnovers during their early years, whereas their 
capital investments may be very high. This means that 
they have to wait long periods to enjoy the benefit 
of their VAT credits. The fiscal group 3which helped to 
prepare the French economic plan recommended the 
elimination of the buffer system. Certain partial 
solutions have already been instituted in France. 
Manufacturers of .selected products have been authorised 
to buy primary materials free of the VAT. Subsidiaries 
have been allowed to transfer their VAT credits to the 
parent company. Certain property leasing companies which 
are unable to utilise their VAT credits have been allowed 
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to transfer them to their tenants. And finally 
the law of 9th July 1970, provided for the reimbursement 
of the VAT credits in favour of manufacturers who had 
been subjected to the tax of 7!%. The group was not 
at all satisfied with these partial solutions and 
recommended the adoption bf a more general solution, 
consisting in the progressive reimbursement of all the 
credits for the VAT. They felt that the most rational 
solution would consist in att~cking the principle causes 
of the phenomenon, rather than its effects. 
Furthermore, they pointed out that the Butoir was 
one aspect of the French system which had not been 
copied by the foreign countires which had come on to 
the VAT. This suggested reimbursement technique 
was generally well received but with a note of reserve 
from the Confederation General du Travail, 4 who were 
concerned at the possibilities of embezzlement if 
the system were not strictly controlled. It seems 
that the general view, both in France and outside, 
is that this buff er system is something of an 
anachronistic aspect of the French system which is better 
avoided. A cash refund on VAT credits is preferable 
since it does away with the inequities and the investment 
disincentives of the buffer. The growing use ~f the 
computer should ensure an adequate cross checking of 
invoices and dampen any enthusiasm for falsifying purchas 
documents in order to gain the VAT credit. 
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7.4- THE DECALAGE 
The decalage is a French expression which describes 
the system whereby current credits for the VAT may 
only be offset against the following months liability. 
This is another aspect of the credit mechanism which 
has been severely criticised by French businessmen, 
and was considered by the Fiscal group in their report 
for the Sixth Plan. The arguments against it are 
essentially financial o It is' claimed that the 
decalage puts a strain on company liquidity, par-ticularly 
in the following cases: Companies which operate in 
seasonal industries and buy large stocks at a certain 
time of the year, or companies whose stocks turnover' 
in less than one month; Companies which form association 
to do bulk buying; and. rapidly growing companies. 
The representatives· of business who argue against the 
decalage, point out that it was originally instituted 
for essentially budge-tary reasons in 191+8, and is no 
longer appropriate. 
On the other hand, there are reasons for re-taining the 
decalage, particularly where the government wishes to 
restrain the supply of liquidity in the econorny. 5 
The system of immediate credits eliminates the _-long 
waiting periods and simplifies bookkeeping because 
each good or service does not have to be seperately 
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traced. This means that it is possible for many 
tax payers to credit the VAT borne by acquired 
goods and services embodied in or relating to a 
final product, before the product is in fact sold. 
In short, the Government is providing credit for 
the flow of goods until the final stage. 
The other arguments are less general, applying 
mainly to France. For that country, the Fiscal 
group estimated_ that it would cost an immediate 
_7 milliard francs and th_at this repayment would entail 
certain inflationary risks. Clearly, we need to 
distinguish between the case of a country which already 
has the decalage, and one which is thinking of 
instituting it. There are far more problems associated 
with dismantling and replacing this feature, than 
simply with not instituting it and, in view of the 
administrative difficulties, it would seem better for 
any new country thinking of the VAT, not to adopt 
a decalage. 
7.5 TRANSITION. 
The actual change from one tax system to another may 
give rise to its own problems. The treatment or 
inventory on hand at the time of the int!Doduction of 
the VAT must be given special consideration. 
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In South Africa, wholesalers may be holding stocks which 
were previously subject to·the selective sales taxes. 
Now unless a credit is granted for that tax, the 
wholesaler will be bearing the VAT burden, as well as 
the manufacturers sales tax burden. The 'Second 
Directive' authorised member states of the E.E.C. to 
grant refunds for previous turnover taxes in the form 
of lump sum credits in respect of inventories on hand 
h . 6 at t at time. 
There are a number of once and for all administration 
costs which occur during the transition phase. For 
example, manuals, pamphlets and guides must be printed 
to explain and clarify the general nature of the tax 
and the areas in which uncertainty might arise. The 
more it is possible to educate the public in advance, 
the less is the resistance and contention which arises 
from uncertainty in any new tax system. Thus programmes 
must be designed for the information media to propagate 
the functioning of the new system. Even where the public 
is well educated, there will be areas of interpretation 
of the law which need to be settled in the courts, and 
this too is a source of cost in transition. 
Now the fact that change in itself does present a cost, 
may be regarded as one of the administrative disadvantagE 
of the VAT. However, it is also possible to take the 
opposite poi11t of view. If, for example, we regard all 
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tax systems as being in a state of evolution towards 
some super system which best achieves the goals of a 
society, then if the VAT is viewed as a later evolutionar 
type than the known alternatives, it is possible that 
an irrunediate change to the VAT would in fact reduce 
the overall transition cost which would have been 
incurred by changing from one intermediate system 
to ·another until finally arriving at the VAT. Thus 
one. could argue that it would be cheaper for South 
Africa to switch from the selective.sales tax direct 
to the VAT, than to adopt first a single stage general 
tax, and later the VAT. 
7.6 EVASillON. 
The two outstanding administrative advantages of 
the VAT are the difficulty of evasion and the provision 
of statistical information. The evasion advantages 
were central to the French preference for the 
fractionated VAT over the single stage turnover taxes. 
Kauffman
7
has summarised them as follows= 
Firstly, under the single stage retail sales tax there 
is a great incentive to evade since it is so difficult 
to check whether the retailer has correctly reported 
his markup. This incentive is strengthened by the 
fact that the retailer saves much more money by evading 
121 
when the entire burden falls on him~ than if he 
were required to pay only a portion of the tax. 
Secondly, there is a division of risk for the State. 
It is considered unlikely that there will be evasion 
simultaneously at all stages in the production 
distribution chain unless there is a conspiracy, 
thus at those stages where evation does occur the 
State looses only part of its revenue. In the event 
of a conspiracy the probability of detection rises 
with the increase in the number of participants which 
is made necessary by the VAT . 
. The final point is the so called built-in policing 
mechanism. Owing to the fact that VAT must have 
been paid on purchases before it may be deducted 
from the sales, each tax-payer acts as a private 
inspector who will make sure that taxes at previous 
stages have been paid in order to minimise his own 
liability. 
7.7 STATISTICS: 
Characteristics such as the regular flow of information 
and the depth of penetration into the working of the 
economy which is provided by the comprehensive base, are 
much sought after by statisticians. The VAT return 
could be used in a number of ways. For example, it 
122 
would provide welcome support for the census 
data which are collected periodically. Accurate and 
up to date information of this sort is very helpful 
in formulation of the economic development programme 
(see du Plessis, 1971); 8 in national income accounting 
and for monitoring stabilisation policy. With the 
exception of the Krogh study (1961) 9 very little has 
been done in the field of input-output analysis in 
South Africa, partly because of the scarcity of 
statistical . information. It is hard to imagine a 
statistical source more appropriate to this task 
than the VAT which is, after all, an input-output tax. 
The VAT also provides immediate statistics for cross 
checking to uncover evasion. At its most efficient 
this cross checking facility could not only be used 
within the VAT system, but also as a check against the 
profit tax figure. It was pointed out among the modes 
of calculation for the VAT, that Value Added would be 
equal to wages plus profits .. Rearranging the expression 
we could say the profits should be equal to Value Added 
minus Wages. Now wages and salaries are readily obtainabl 
from the Pay-As-You-Earn data, and coupled with the Value 
Added. figure, this should give a unique cross check agains 
the profits tax. Although attractive theoretically much 
of the practical value of such comprehensive cr?SS 
checking is lost if there are exemptions which complicate 
the calculation. 
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Therefore, this should be regarded as one of the 
less immediate potential benefits. It is clear that 
the VAT return can be designed to render a wealth of 
statistical information. However, this benefit is not 
free and must be traded off against the cost of 
administrative complexity. The more information required 
on the form, the more complex it becomes to fill in and 
to administer. Fortunately, it is possible to retain 
a large measure of the statistical value with a 
relatively simple form if there is only one VAT .rate, 
and the number of exemptions is limited. The simplest 
existing VAT return, is the one used by the Danish.lo 
A special accounting booklet is issued by the Directorate 
of Taxes, in which the businessman records his purchases, 
tax credits, sales, tax payments, and any comments he 
wishes to make. From this record he extracts tax 
payable, tax deduct able and tax liable. These three 
figures are entered onto a post card with identification 
code and returned to the Revenue Office. This final post 
card return is very simple to administer, but does not 
render very much statistical information. If it were 
modified so as to include the totals from the accounting 
booklet under the purchase, sales and tax credits columns 
the statistical yield would be much greater, and there 
would be very little difference in administration. 
On the other hand a form as complex as the French VAT 
return, with its numerous classifications, is probably 
not worth i~s weight in paper work. If the VAT return· 
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is to be used to provide data for an input output 
model, it would be necessary for the tax payers' 
identification code to subsume an industrial 
classification code. The ideal statistical return 
would also subsume a product classification code. 
But until most businesses are running on computerised 
systems, this refinement is unlikely to be feasible. 
The question of industrial classification is a common 
problem in input/output analysis11 and could lead to 
some difficulty in specifying the sub codes. However, 
as long as there is only one VAT rate, there is no 
incentive to mis-classification on the part of tax 
payers and we may regard this as being more of a 
technical input/output problem than a VAT problem. 
7.8 SUGGESTED CHARACTERISTICS OF A SYSTEM FOR SOUTH AFRICA: 
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that the 
VAT may be designed and operated in a number of different 
ways. Many of the administrative problems which have 
arisen in other countries can be avoided if the system 
is correctly designed. A proposed system should try to 
incorporate the following characteristics. 
1. There should be a single rate with minimal 
exemption, as suggested in the section on the base. 
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This would eliminate the catching up problem, 
it would simplify the design of the tax form, 
facilitate cross checking, and minimise the 
problems of partial exemption. 
2. The mode of calculation should be o:B the indirect 
substractive type, thus taking advantage of the 
policing mechanism. However, the functions of 
collection and inspection should be divorced -
in order to allow frequent collection while at the 
same time taking advantage of the administrative 
simplicity of the annual audit of accounts for 
inspection. The mechanism suggested here would be 
similar to that operating in Germany. A system 
of quarterly self assessment for the VAT with annual 
audits and irregular spot checks by Government 
would be consistent with the views of the Franzsen 
Commission regarding self assessment. 
3. Both the French decalage and buffer systems should 
be avoided. Current tax credits on purchase should 
be set off against tai payable on current sales 
and where there is a net credit this should be 
refunded in cash. 
4. Small businesses with turnovers of less than RlO 000 
per annum should be given the option of either coming 
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into the system at the normal rate, or of complete 
exemption. It has been shown (section on small 
business) that this would facilitate administration 
by reducing the number of tax payers, without 
excessively reducing the revenue base of the tax. 
5. Transition should be made as smooth as possible 
by the institution of a careful programme for 
educating the public and business in advance 
of the tax. The State should adopt an accommodating 
policy with respect to once and for all type problems, 
such as inventory purchase before the institution of 
the tax. It is important that the public should not 
be antagonised in this period when they are forming 
their opinions towards the tax, especially in view 
of the fact that people tend to be most sceptical 
of things which they do not fully understand. 
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APPENDIX 1 
CALCULATION OF THE.CORRELATION BETWEEN CHANGES IN 
DISPOSABLE INCOME AND INVESTMENT. 
FORMULAE 
r ;:: ~ ";,( "i I ~Y- ~~ 
s xy :::: n-\ ( <£ X..: 'f..t. -~·J(....\. z_ 'i..:4 l 
s2 
x ::::: ~-\ l )( "' ";). c 2 ~-'->I" l 
g2 ' y ::::: '\\.-:- \ l ~ "-\..;_ ~ - (z_ '-\.:__)<o../ -f'l ~l 
z 
VALUES CALCULATED FROM RAW DATA · 
s xy ::: 22 849,057 
;:: 223,465 
s x Sy ::: 44 340,819 
r = ,515 30 
2 226319 r = 
z = '· 5 7 
z = ,1244 
RAW DATA 
sou::~c:s: ADAPTED FROM THE SUPPLE1·JEf\!T TO THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN RESERVE BANK Q.U-~"iTErtLY BULLETIN, JUN.lli 1971 


















































































APPENDIX II .. 
EUROPA INSTITUTE. 
TABLES SHOWING THE EFTECT OF 
VAT ON PRICES, CONSUMPTION, 
PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT. 
Source~ Collection Etudes: 
Serie Concurence - Rapprochement. 
Des Legislations No. 16 
Bruxelles 1970, 
Pp. 5 5- 5 8. 
Tableau 7 : Eff ets sur les E..ri..~ a la _c;:_C?_n ... !3 • .<?EJ_ma t_ion, par branche d I ac ti vi te , 
des modifications de politique resultant de l'unification fis-





Industrie alimentaire (produits 
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produits) 
Boissons et taba.c 
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4,2 Autres services 
Total 3,2 3,7 4,4 
55 
T~bleau 8 : Effets sur la consommation et sur la demande finale globale 1 
par brr.mche d 1 nctivite, des modifications de politiquc re-
sultant de l'unification fiscale dans le cadre de la GEE 
(variations en %) 
Branches 
d'activite 
Consommation · Dernande f~l~obale 
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Tableau 9 Effets sur la production, par branche d'activite, des modification 
de politique resultant de l'unification fiscale dans le cadre de 1 






Q'li ts an imaux) 
InC.ustrie aliment a ire (a.u-
tres produits) 
Boiesons et tabac 
Textiles 
Habi:lement et chaussures 
Pa pier 
Autres industries 
Indus-:;rie chimique et raf-
finer~es de petrole 
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Constru~tion mecanique 
Industr:'..e e le ctrotechnique 
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Eau, ga.z, electricite 
Construction du bAtiment 
Propriete 'ie locaux d'ha-
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Tableau 10 Effets sur l'emploi, par branche d'activite, des modifications de 
politique resultant de l'unification fiscale dans le cadre de la 
C .E .E. -(variations en %) • 
Branches d'activite !Majoration des Maj oration dos Maj oration dos 
taux. de la TVA taux de la TVA tame de la TVA 
et reduction combineo a une 
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cations 
Autres services - 0,1 - o, 2 - o,6 
. Commerce - 0,2 - 0,1 - 0,1 
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